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Hard is the fortune of all womankind
She is always controlled, always confined
Controlled by her parents until she is a wife
A slave to her husband the rest of her life
Traditional
When Congress debated the Thirteenth Amendment1 and its prohibitions
against slavery and involuntary servitude, anxious members inquired whether
it would alter the traditional relationship of husband and wife.2 Their concern
materialized out of a political context in which those who sought abolition of
African American chattel slavery and the establishment of women's rights were
applying the norm of individual freedom beyond the narrow scope of landed
white men.3 At that time, the metaphor "women are slaves" had rhetorical
currency and suggested that white women shared with African American men
and women a similar legal and social status of non-identity and disability.4
No matter how rhetorically useful this metaphor may have seemed then or may
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1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § I provides in pertinent part "[nleither slavery nor involuntary
servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist
within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." Section 2 provides that Congress shall
have the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
2. "1 suppose before the law a woman would be equal to a man, a woman would be as free as a man.
A wife would be equal to her husband before the law." CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1488 (1864)
(statement of Sen. Howard). "A husband has a right of property in the service of his wife; he has the right
to the management of his household affairs .... All these rights rest upon the same basis as a man's right
of property in the service of slaves." CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 215 (1865) (statement of Rep.
White).
3. See ELIZABETH SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT
(1988), in which she acknowledges the link between "women's movements in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries" and "abolitionist and civil rights activity," but later argues that too much can be made of this
because of the role played by sexist and racist attitudes in both movements. Id. at 11, 115-26.
4. JOHN STUART MILL, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN 32 (1869) ("IAI female slave has (in Christian
countries) an admitted right ... to refuse to her master the last familiarity. Not so the wife ... he can
claim her and enforce the lowest degradation of a human being .... she is held in this worst description
of slavery . . ").
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seem now, it was and remains grossly inaccurate and inherently racist.' It
obscured the fact that white women were slaveholders or beneficiaries of the
slave system.6 It failed to recognize that even though there were significant
legal, political and social restraints on white women, they did not as a class
suffer in the way that African Americans did under slavery. Finally, it ignored
the fact that African American women were slaves and that other women were
not, no matter what their subordinate legal or socio-economic status.7 So, the
metaphor was and is fundamentally flawed both by its generality and its
exclusion.
It was not slavery, as metaphor or term, however, that evoked the concern
of some Congressmen that their dominant positions in their families were in
jeopardy. Rather, their uneasy recognition of the Amendment's potential to
reach into marital relationships was sparked by the term "involuntary
servitude," which was explicitly included in the Thirteenth Amendment to
prohibit the creation of slave-like conditions through the private use of force.
Although the Congressmen's anxiety was treated as absurd by sponsors of the
Amendment, an examination of the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition against
involuntary servitude in the context of the conditions to which women who are
battered' in intimate relationships such as marriage9 are subjected reveals that
5. See SPELMAN, supra note 3, at 40 n.8, 47, 50, 114-32, where she attempts to show "that the notion
of a generic 'woman' functions in feminist thought much the way the notion of generic 'man' has
functioned in Western philosophy: it obscures the heterogeneity of women and cuts off examination of the
significance of such heterogeneity for feminist theory and political activity." Id. at ix.
This metaphor is a prime example of what Adrienne Rich refers to as "white solipsism:" a vantage
point from which we "think, imagine, and speak as if whiteness described the world." ADRIENNE RICH,
ON LIES, SECRETS, AND SILENCE 299 (1979). The metaphor also encapsulates the way in which the
experience of African American women is excluded from the experience of "women," which when it is
not preceded by a racial adjective has always meant "white women." The exclusion of African American
women by white women is addressed by ANGELA DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE, AND CLASS (1981); BELL HOOKS,
AIN'T I A WOMAN: BLACK WOMEN AND FEMINISM (1981); BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY: FROM
MARGIN TO CENTER (1984); BELL HOOKS, TALKING BACK: THINKING FEMINIST, THINKING BLACK (1989);
AUDRE LORDE, SISTER OUTSIDER (1984); Maria C. Lugones & Elizabeth V. Spelman, Have We Got a
Theory for You! Feminist Theory, Cultural Imperialism, and the Demand for 'The Woman's Voice," 6
WOMEN'S STUD. INT'L F. 573 (1983); Elizabeth Spelman, Theories of Race and Gender: The Erasure of
Black Women, 5 QUEST 36 (1982).
6. See SPELMAN, supra note 3, at 141.
7. Id.
8. Lenore Walker, an expert on battered women, defines a battered woman as one "who is or has been
in an intimate relationship with a man who repeatedly subjects or subjected her to forceful physical and/or
psychological abuse." LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 203 (1984). Throughout
this article, I use her definition, but restrict it to physical behavior only, as the United States Supreme Court
in 1988 limited involuntary servitude to physical coercion. See infra text accompanying notes 79-92 for
a discussion of United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 (1988).
9. I adopt the gender specificity of Lenore Walker's definition since the available data on heterosexual
battering overwhelmingly demonstrates that the typical heterosexual battering relationship is one in which
a woman is battered by a man to whom she is married or with whom she is in an intimate relationship.
Nonetheless, I recognize that those who are battered and those who batter can be of either gender and that
they are not necessarily in heterosexual relationships.
This article consciously explores battering only in the context of heterosexual relationships. Such an
approach admittedly renders this work heterosexist, but there are four reasons for the limited focus. First,
the metaphor "women are slaves" implicitly answers the question, "the slaves of whom?" with the answer,
men. Therefore, the metaphor, which serves as the point of departure of this article, is male-referenced.
Second, the metaphor was used during the 19th century to refer to the condition of women upon marriage.
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their anxiety was well-founded. This article undertakes an examination of the
theoretical, doctrinal and factual connections between involuntary servitude and
intimate violence. 10
First, this article explores the meaning of involuntary servitude as
prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment and its criminal enforcing statutes.
The scope of the Thirteenth Amendment is revealed through an examination
of chattel slavery as an exploitive legal, economic, and social system;
contemporaneous Congressional debate; and judicial interpretation of the
Amendment and the criminal statutes. From an examination of these sources,
a paradigm of involuntary servitude emerges. Second, this article examines
battering and its social context as a backdrop to the analysis of whether three
battered women, 1 whose lives are portrayed through narrative, 2 were held
in involuntary servitude by their batterers. This study reveals that the key
distinction between the battered women's cases and the judicially recognized
cases of involuntary servitude is the intimate origin of their relationships and
not the degree or nature of the coercion or the services they provided. 3
Third, the connections between chattel slavery and the status and conditions of married women were noted
in the debate on the Thirteenth Amendment. Finally, there are many reported cases of battering in
heterosexual relationships and extensive literature and research on the topic, while literature and research
on battering in lesbian and gay relationships is only now emerging, and there are few reported cases. See
NAMING THE VIOLENCE: SPEAKING OUT ABOUT LESBIAN BATTERING (Kerry Lobel ed., 1986); Claudia
Card, Defusing the Bomb: Lesbian Ethics and Horizontal Violence, 3 LESBIAN ETHICS 91 (1989); Claire
M. Renzetti, Violence in Lesbian Relationships: A Preliminary Analysis of Causal Factors, 3 J.
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 381 (1988); Ruthann Robson, Lavender Bruises: Intra-Lesbian Violence, Law
and Lesbian Legal Theory, 20 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 567 (1990); Comment, The Defending ofAccused
Homosexuals: Will Society Accept Their Use of the Battered Wife Defense?, 4 GLENDALE L. REV. 208
(1982).
Having acknowledged the limited focus of this paper, however, it is important to state that battering
in gay and lesbian relationships is as serious as battering in heterosexual relationships and that it too may
present cases that constitute involuntary servitude. This article is only meant to lay the groundwork for
further examinations of involuntary servitude in all types of intimate relationships. See Robson, supra, at
572 (citing JANICE G. RAYMOND, A PASSION FOR FRIENDS 66-64 (1986)).
10. In 1979 Kathleen Barry wrote a ground-breaking book entitled Female Sexual Slavery in which
she exposed the international extent of violence against women and the passive role of the United Nations
in working against female sexual slavery. Her sociological work along with the personal experiences related
to me by battered women sparked this article. I thank them. See generally KATHLEEN BARRY, FEMALE
SEXUAL SLAVERY (1979).
11. These three cases represent the end of the continuum of the violence and coercion that battered
women experience. These are all cases in which the battered women ultimately killed their batterers in
self-defense, yet they are typical of the violence and the services provided in battering relationships
generally. Each case provides unusually detailed accounts of the violence and the services.
12. See Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of
Feminist Legal Theory, 3 WIsC. WOMEN'S L. REV. 81, 90 (1987) ("INjarrative is emerging as a feminist
method of moral argument, both in practice and theory.").
13. A comparison of the services provided in the involuntary servitude and battering cases reveals
that while domestic services are found in both, sexual services provided directly to the coercer are not.
However, an examination of the full range of services provided by female chattel slaves reveals that both
sexual and reproductive services were a well-entrenched characteristic of chattel slavery and that these
services were provided directly to the master. Thus, if involuntary servitude prohibits that which is "akin
to slavery," then it must be interpreted as prohibiting violent coercion of sexual services. See Butler v.
Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 332 (1916) (Involuntary servitude was intended "to cover those forms of compulsory
labor akin to African slavery.").
This is not to suggest that there is not a real distinction between the relationship between master and
slave and batterer and battered woman. There is. The most important distinction is that in the former the
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Third, this article challenges the legitimacy of the view that the involuntary
servitude clause of the Thirteenth Amendment prohibits only public sphere
"marketplace" behavior and thereby does not reach private sphere cases of
battering. Fourth, it finds support for the inclusion of battering in the
involuntary servitude prohibition of the Thirteenth Amendment in the
mutability of the private/public dichotomy, in changes in the legal status of
women, and in the trend to treat crimes in the private and public spheres as
equally worthy of the laws' protection, as demonstrated by the movement to
abrogate the marital rape exemption. 4
This article demonstrates that some battered women are held in involuntary
servitude and suggests that a civil constitutional claim as well as a criminal
constitutional claim could be brought against the batterer. More importantly,
however, this article seeks to begin a new theoretical discourse on battering.
In recent years, much of the theory developed about battered women has been
about the psychological and emotional responses to the battering, issues raised
in cases where battered women kill or attempt to kill their batterers in self-
defense. ' The woman's internal responses to battering and the ways in which
they shape her conduct are embodied in the concept of the "battered woman
syndrome."" 6 Although naming the characteristics shared by many battered
slave had neither control over entering the relationship nor legal or social power to end it; in the latter the
battered woman enters voluntarily, and while she may not be able to end it because of the batterer's
violence and the socio-economic and legal conditions that make leaving difficult as well as dangerous, she
does in fact have the "freedom" to leave. However, this distinction is irrelevant in the contemporary law
of involuntary servitude. The law recognizes that even where a relationship between an employer and an
employee is entered into voluntarily by both parties, when the relationship is coercively maintained by
threats of or actual physical violence, it converts to one that is involuntary. Thus, the person held in
involuntary servitude has the "freedom" to leave, but does not because of the violence and the
socio-economic and legal conditions that make escape both difficult and dangerous.
14. Public and private sphere distinctions have been used to justify dissimilar treatment of similar
conduct. This has been particularly true of battering and of marital rape. Until very recently battering of
one's wife was treated as a non-crime, and the battered wife had no criminal remedies available to her.
In contrast, if similar conduct occurred between strangers, making it more public in nature, the conduct
was a crime and remedies were available. The law's treatment of marital rape is even more revealing as
it has been more resistant to change. There are still jurisdictions that do not regard marital rape as a crime.
In all jurisdictions, however, rape is a crime when it occurs between strangers. Both the exclusion of battery
of one's wife and marital rape from the law's protection have been historically justified by categorizing
them as private-sphere events and thus not to be interfered with by the state. The state's refusal to interfere
in marital relationships involving battery and rape preserved the relationship of domination and
subordination. However, the law regarding violence in the marital relationship has changed substantially.
This trend is rooted in the relatively recent recognition of women as independent human beings,
regardless of marital status, with the same rights to privacy, physical safety and dignity as men. When
similar conduct is treated differently by the law based on whether it occurs in the public or the private
sphere, the legitimacy of the distinction is immediately suspect. See infra notes 232-247 and accompanying
text.
15. See State v. Kelly, 178 A.2d 364 (N.J. 1984).
16. The battered woman syndrome is a psychological response to battering. See generally WALKER,
supra note 8. As a psychological concept it is incorporated into the American Psychiatric Association's
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS Ill, the diagnostic bible of psychological
and psychobiological phenomena. The battered woman syndrome is used to explain the conduct of a battered
woman when she kills her batterer in self-defense. Evidence of the syndrome through expert testimony is
relevant to the woman's self-defense claim in a criminal prosecution for murder. See Elizabeth M.
Schneider, Describing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony
on Battering, 9 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 195 (1986); Jenge R. Bunyak, Battered Wives Who Kill: Civil
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women was a step forward in understanding their behavior, it has had the
unwelcome effect of focusing discussion on the reasonableness of the battered
woman's response rather than on the unreasonableness of the batterer's
conduct. By demonstrating the similarities between the situations of battered
women and involuntary servitude, in which the analytic focus is on the
coercive conduct of the "master" and only secondarily on the conduct's effect
on the "servant," this article attempts to shift the discourse away from the
internal life of the battered woman to a new theoretical perspective on the
conduct of the batterer.
I acknowledge that to use three cases in which battered women have killed
their batterers seems to contradict my goal of shifting the theoretical discourse
away from the internal life of the battered woman and toward the conduct of
the batterer. I have chosen this approach for two reasons, the first analytically
pragmatic and the second theoretically significant. First, these cases provide
more factual detail than any others I reviewed. They thus permit a textured
comparison between the coercion used in involuntary servitude cases and that
used in battering cases. Second, these cases do not focus on the internal life
of the battered woman, but rather on the coercive behavior of the man and
what she did to him as a result. Each case reveals that battering is more than
the expression of uncontrolled anger; it is the expression of the batterer's
desire to control the will of another-the woman he batters.
I. THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT
A. History, Society and Involuntary Servitude
In the following section I explore the historical and social context within
which Congress created the Thirteenth Amendment. I do this to add texture
to the meaning of the Amendment's prohibition against involuntary servitude.
This task is essential because judicial interpretation of the Amendment in
criminal involuntary servitude cases has unnecessarily and, I argue,
inaccurately characterized the Amendment as narrow in scope-intended only
to address the evil 'of violently coerced wage labor. A review of statements
made in Congressional debates reveals that members of Congress knew that
slavery was both a social and an economic evil and that there were parallels
between the relationships of master/slave and husband/wife.
The Thirteenth Amendment declares that "[n] either slavery nor involuntary
servitude, except as a punishment for crime.. . shall exist within the United
States ... "17 Congress intended the Thirteenth Amendment to abolish the
Liability and the Admissibility of Battered Woman's Syndrome Testimony,.4 LAW & INEQ. J. 603 (1986);
Comment, Evidence-The Battered Woman s Syndrome in Illinois: Admissibility of Expert Testimony, 11
S. ILL. U. L.J. 137 (1986).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. This section is self-executing. The United States Supreme Court
has consistently stated that where there is a violation of a law enacted to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment
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system of chattel slavery under which whites legally possessed African
Americans as personal property18 and to abolish legal ownership of any
human being of any color.' 9 It was an unusual prohibition, reaching as it did
to control private rather than state conduct.20 It is evident from the language
of the Amendment itself that Congress did not confine its action to the
prohibition of chattel slavery, but employed the term "involuntary servitude"
to abolish all prospective forms of slavery as well. 2'
In an early twentieth-century case, the United States Supreme Court
announced that involuntary servitude included "those forms of compulsory
labor akin to African slavery which in practical operation would tend to
produce like undesirable results. "22 Ten years earlier the Court had stated,
"[t]he things denounced are slavery and involuntary servitude . . . All
there is also an independent violation of the Thirteenth Amendment. Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 25
(1944); Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25, 31 (1942); United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 150 (1914);
Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 239 (1911).
18. For the history of the Thirteenth Amendment, see G. Sidney Buchanan, The Quest For Freedom:
A Legal History of the Thirteenth Amendment, 12 HoUs. L. REV. 1 (1974). For articles discussing
application of the Thirteenth Amendment to modem conditions, see generally Andrew Koppelman, Forced
Labor: A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of Abortion, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 480 (1990); Robert L. Misner
& John H. Clough, Arrestees as Informants: A Thirteenth Amendment Analysis, 29 STAN. L. REV. 713
(1977); Harry H. Shapiro, Involuntary Servitude: The Need For A More Flexible Approach, 19 RuTGERs
L. REV. 65 (1964); Jacobus tenBroek, Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, 39
CAL. L. REV. 171, 174-183 (1951); John M. Cook, Note, Involuntary Servitude: Modem Conditions
Addressed In United States v. Mussry, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 153 (1984); James H. Haag, Note,
Involuntary Servitude: An Eighteenth-Century Concept In Search of a Twentieth-CenturyDefinition, 19 PAC.
L.J. 873 (1988).
19. In 1906, the United States Supreme Court declared the Thirteenth Amendment to be "the
denunciation of a condition" reaching "every race and every individual." Hodges v. United States, 203
U.S. 1, 16-17 (1906). To emphasize the sweep of the Amendment, the Court quoted Justice Miller in the
Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873): "To withdraw the mind from the contemplation
of this grand yet simple declaration of the personal freedom of all the human race within the jurisdiction
of this government... requires an effort, to say the least of it." Id. at 69.
20. To place control of conduct within the private sphere in the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment
was radical; it limited the power of masters over slaves and employers over employees where power has
been unbridled. It implicated the rights of husbands over wives by analogy. Amy D. Stanley, Conjugal
Bonds and Wage Labor: Rights of Contract in the Age of Emancipation, 75 J. AM. HIST. 471 (1988) states
that Senator Sumner, the original proponent of the Thirteenth Amendment, "[Iike most others of his
generation .... took for granted that relations of marriage and wage labor were complementary." Id. at
471. She also suggests that Sumner's assumptions dated back to enlightenment theories of natural rights,
relying on Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, Property and Patriarchy in Classical Bourgeois Political Theory, 4
RADICAL HIST. REV. 36-59 (1977). Id. at 471 n.1.
21. "The word servitude is of a larger meaning than slavery, as the latter is popularly understood in
this country, and the obvious purpose was to forbid all shades and conditions of African slavery."
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 69.
22. E.g., Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 332 (1916); see also Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275,
282 (1897). Thus, the forms of involuntary servitude are varied. Peonage is a form of involuntary servitude
prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment arising from indebtedness to a master. Labor is coerced, either
through legal sanction or physical force or threats of either, to pay off the debt. Clyatt v. United States,
197 U.S. 207, 215, 218 (1905). Involuntary servitude is also the "Iclompulsion of . . . service by the
constant fear of imprisonment under the criminal laws" where a person fined for a misdemeanor could
contract with another to pay off his or her debts, but the law has made the breach of the contract a crime.
United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 146, 150 (1914). Where state laws made it a crime to fail to
provide labor after receiving an advance, the Court found the laws to create a condition of involuntary
servitude. Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944); Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25 (1942); Bailey v.
Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911).
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understand by these terms a condition of enforced compulsory service of one
to another."' While the meaning of the term "involuntary servitude" is
broader than that of slavery, the nature of the servitude and the ways in which
one's services are coerced are impossible to discern from the phrase alone.
Nonetheless, the Thirteenth Amendment is generally, albeit implicitly,
interpreted by the courts as a prohibition against coerced wage labor in the
market economy. 24 One view of chattel slavery is that it is merely an
economic system of free labor. If one accepts this limited perspective, the
Thirteenth Amendment guarantees workers nothing more than the freedom to
contract their labor. Although this perspective reflects the ideology of
individualism and free will essential to the industrial expansion of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,' it ignores the many ways in which
scholars deem slavery to have been as much a complex social system as an
economic one. This economic justification has limited the Thirteenth
Amendment to a public sphere "marketplace" prohibition, rather than a private
sphere "family" prohibition.26
The contemporary criminal27 involuntary servitude cases28 reflect the
23. Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 16 (1906).
24. See infra notes 60-116 and accompanying text.
25. Justice Harlan believed that the Thirteenth Amendment reflected
the individualistic ethic of [the] time, which emphasized personal freedom and embodied a distaste
for governmental interference which was soon to culminate in the era of laissez-faire ....
[Mlost of those men would have regarded it as a great intrusion on individual liberty for the
Government to take from a man the power to refuse ... to enter into a... private transaction.
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 473-74 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
26. Frances Olsen in The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HAMt.
L. REV. 1497, 1501 & n. 16 (1983) describes this "characterization" of the public/private dichotomy as
.misleading" because there "are two different dichotomies involved.., on one hand, a dichotomy between
the market, considered public, and the family, considered private; on the other hand, a dichotomy between
the state, considered public, and civil society, considered private." This article uses the first dichotomy
to demonstrate, as Olsen does in her article, the degree to which these categories are mutable.
27. The original criminal statute passed to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition against
slavery and involuntary servitude was the 1867 peonage statute, Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 187, § 1, 14
Stat. 546. It prohibited "[tlhe holding of any person to service or labor under the system known as peonage
... and all laws.., which have ... established, maintained or enforced... the voluntary or involuntary
service ... of any persons as peons, in liquidation of any debt or obligation . . . ." Later, this became
18 U.S.C. § 1581 (1982) (originally enacted as Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 1581, 62 Stat. 772),
which provides that "[whoever holds or returns any person to a condition of peonage, or arrests any person
with the intent of placing him in or returning him to a condition of peonage, shall be fined . . . or
imprisoned., or both." Id. Peonage is defined as a condition of forced labor coerced due to indebtedness.
See Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 215 (1904). However, other criminal statutes prohibiting the
importation of African slaves had been passed prior to the Thirteenth Amendment, and were made
applicable to "any person" regardless of race by the Thirteenth Amendment. Act of Mar. 1807, ch. 22,
§ 6, 2 Stat. 427 (prohibiting the sale or purchase or the holding to service or labor of slaves imported after
Dec. 31, 1807 and modified by the Act of Apr. 20, 1818, ch. 91, 3 Stat. 452. This statute was the
precursor to Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 10, § 248, 35 Stat. 1139 (1909) (prohibiting the importation, holding
or selling of a slave) and Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 10, § 271, 35 Stat. 1142 (1909) (prohibiting the
importation of slaves, "inveigled or forcibly kidnapped" to be held in involuntary servitude). These
sections, 248 and 271, were consolidated in the 1948 revision of the Crimes and Criminal Procedure Code
as 18 U.S.C. § 1584 (1982) (originally enacted as Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 773). Section
1584 provides that "[wihoever knowingly and willfully holds to involuntary servitude or sells into any
condition of involuntary servitude, any other person . . . held shall be fined not more than $5,000 or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both."
In the 1948 revisions, sections 1581 (peonage) and 1584 (involuntary servitude) were grouped with
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economic view of the Thirteenth Amendment. Cases of involuntary servitude
prosecuted under the Amendment's criminal enforcing statutes have addressed
explicitly the sufficiency of coercion, but have assumed without explanation
that the servitude fits within the scope of the Amendment's prohibition. The
typical involuntary servitude case involves an otherwise legitimate
employer/employee relationship. By "legitimate" I mean that there is an
exchange of labor for wages in the above-ground economy. By "otherwise"
I mean that unlike most market employer/employee relationships, the
involuntary servitude relationship is characterized by either the threat or the
use of violence to coerce the worker against his or her will to provide services
for the employer's profit or pleasure. 29 These cases frequently involve
immigrant and impoverished agricultural or domestic workers.
Other involuntary servitude cases,30 however, involve illegitimate market
relationships, such as prostitution.31 I refer to these relationships as
illegitimate because they are not considered part of the above-ground or
legitimate economy. The distinction I draw between legitimate and illegitimate
markets does not in any way challenge the public/private dichotomy that
pervades involuntary servitude doctrine, as both the legitimate and the
illegitimate market are part of the public sphere.
Although judicial interpretations of the Amendment have adopted a narrow
view of it as governing only public sphere relationships, slavery and,
derivatively, involuntary servitude were not solely of either sphere, but of
both. A competing view of the Thirteenth Amendment which takes account
of the breadth of the impact of slavery and involuntary servitude challenges
the rigid theoretical boundaries between the public and the private, the market
and the family spheres. This broad view of slavery holds that slavery was not
simply an economic system of free labor, but was also a complex social
system.32 From this perspective, the prohibition of slavery and involuntary
servitude was a prohibition on much more than coerced wage labor. This
the following sections prohibiting other aspects of slavery: section 1582 (vessels for slave trade); section
1583 (enticement into slavery); section 1585 (seizure, detention, transportation or sale of slaves); section
1586 (service on slave vessels); section 1587 (possession of slaves on a vessel); section 1588 (transportation
of slaves from United States). Of all of these, section 1584 is the most broadly applicable and most relevant
to this article's inquiry. In United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 (1988), Justice O'Connor writing
for the majority, stated that involuntary servitude as used in section 1584 "clearly was borrowed from the
Thirteenth Amendment . . . [making] the conclusion that Congress intended the phrase to have the same
meaning in both places logical, if not inevitable." 487 U.S. at 944-45.
28. See infra notes 60-116 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 61-92 and accompanying text.
30. These cases certainly do not depict the only or even the typical relationship between a prostitute
and a pimp. Frequently, such a relationship is quite complex, having characteristics of both an
employer/employee relationship as well as an intimate one between lovers.
31. Prositution is illegal in most states. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.300 (Michie 1986);
N.Y. PROSTrrUTION LAW § 230 (McKinney 1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-1 (West 1979).
32. Note, The 'New' Thirteenth Amendment: A Preliminary Analysis, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1294,
1301-02 (1969) (arguing that Congress recognized that slavery "involved a complex of social and economic
as well as legal interrelationships . . . . [The Thirteenth Amendment] appears to have been designed as
a full response to the evil perceived.").
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perspective on the Thirteenth Amendment recognizes that slavery had economic
and non-economic, personal and non-personal elements.
Congress must have recognized African-American chattel slavery as both
a social and an economic system sanctioned by laws governing both the private
sphere of the master and slave relationship and the public sphere of the
economic relationship of capital and labor.33 And it knew only too well the
extent to which the South depended on this system. 3 Nonetheless, when
Congress constructed the Thirteenth Amendment including the term
"involuntary servitude," it did so to address what it believed to be the root of
slavery and the antithesis of healthy capitalism: coerced labor." In doing so,
it collapsed a complex system of subordination with both private and public
aspects into a flattened concept of involuntary servitude-a state in which the
right of the individual worker to exchange his or her labor freely for wages36
is nullified by coercion.
Congressional concern about the Amendment's reach into traditional social
relationships manifested itself in discussions of the Amendment's regulation
of private conduct: that of one person coercing another to provide services
against his or her will. 37 The regulation of the private conduct of persons in
the public sphere of the market raised the spectre of control of private conduct
in the private sphere of the home.3" Some Congressmen expressed concern
that the Thirteenth Amendment had the potential to reach into the private
sphere of the home and to alter the traditional relationship between husband
33. See infra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
34. See Note, supra note 32, at 1301-1302 for an interesting discussion of the extent to which this
realization had an impact on the framers of the Amendment.
35. Evidence of this appears throughout Congressional debates on the Amendment. For example,
Representative Ingersoll of Illinois stated that the Thirteenth Amendment would guarantee the slave's right
"to till the soil, to earn his bread, to enjoy the rewards of his own labor, [to enjoy] the endearments of
family ties." CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2989-90 (1864). See generally Buchanan, supra note
18.
President Andrew Johnson summarized the belief that slavery was antithetical to the needs of
capitalism:
Slavery was essentially a monopoly of labor, and as such locked the states where it prevailed
against the incoming of free industry . . . . Here there is no room for favored classes or
monopolies; the principle of our government is that of equal laws and freedom of industry.
Letter to Congress, Dec. 4, 1865 quoted by Buchanan, id. at 5, from J. RICHARDSON, MESSAGES AND
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENT 3559 (1897).
36. The Supreme Court has recognized that:
[t]he undoubted aim of the Thirteenth Amendment. .. was not merely to end slavery but to
maintain a system of completely free and voluntary labor throughout the United States... [I1n
general the defense against oppressive hours, pay, working conditions, or treatment is the right
to change employers. When the master can compel and the laborer cannot escape the obligation
to go on, there is no power below to redress and no incentive above to relieve a harsh
overlordship or unwholesome conditions of labor.
Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 17-18 (1944).
37. Unlike the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, the Thirteenth Amendment, U.S.
CONST. amend. XIII, does not require state action and governs individual conduct.
38. Stanley, supra note 20, at 474 ("those who clarified the meaning of emancipation, whether inside
legislative chambers or out of doors, stated the link between contract and freedom with new urgency and
precision. That enterprise and the configuration of legal tenets, economic principles, and moral assumptions
to which it gave credence were rife with unsettling implications for the law of husband and wife.").
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and wife.39 This anxiety was fueled by the ongoing and contemporaneous
debate of women's suffrage and equality and was voiced in Congressional
debate on the Amendment.4'
Senator Howard worried that if the Amendment was to be enacted "a
woman would be equal to a man ... [a] wife would be equal to her husband
and as free . . . before the law."41 Representative Cox was concerned that
if Congress had the power to regulate "domestic slavery" then perhaps it could
exercise this power to "change the relation of. .. husband and wife."42 To
allay his colleagues' fears, Senator Sumner the chief proponent of the
Thirteenth Amendment in the Senate, argued that the right to contract and the
right to maintain a family were natural rights essential to the concept of
freedom.43 In this he implied that to regard the Thirteenth Amendment as
interfering with the traditional legal relationship between husband and wife
would be reductio ad absurdum. His narrow interpretation of the Thirteenth
Amendment assured its opponents that the Amendment would not in any way
alter the family under the law, but rather was to give everyone, regardless of
their race, the right to create and maintain a family under the laws then
applicable to only whites and freed slaves." Such a family presumed the
traditional authority of the husband over the wife.
Early cases interpreting the Thirteenth Amendment indicate that Congress
did not intend it to alter traditional relationships other than that of master and
slave. In addition, Congress did not intend it to abrogate the right of the
sovereign to demand services from its citizens. To this end, the courts
excluded service -relationships mandated by the sovereign such as jury
service,4' military service,' and work on the roads.47 The text of the
Amendment itself excludes from the definition of involuntary servitude coerced
labor as punishment for a crime.4" Furthermore, the United States Supreme
Court interpreted the Thirteenth Amendment as never intending to disturb
traditional relationships regarded by the common law as deserving of special
status, such as the rights of parents over children.49 Although the relationship
of husband and wife was of great concern to Congress, no cases refer to this
relationship. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to conclude that, like the parent and
39. Id. at 477.
40. Id. at 479.
41. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1488 (1864). He raised this concern in debate over the form
of the constitutional amendment proposed by Senator Sumner in 1864, which declared that "Everywhere
within the limits of the United States ... all persons are equal before the law, so that no person can hold
another as a slave." CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 521-522 (1864).
42. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 242 (1865).
43. Senator Sumner, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 91 (1865); See also Robert Kasson, CONG.
GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2nd Sess. 193 (1865).
44. Id.
45. Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578, 589, n.ll (1973) (dictum).
46. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 390 (1918).
47. Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328 (1916).
48. See supra note 1.
49. Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 282 (1897) (dictum).
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child relationship, the relationship of husband and wife was considered by the
courts to be protected from the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition by its
unique common law status.
If Congress had embodied all of the services provided in chattel slavery
through its definition of involuntary servitude, it would have been more faithful
to its attempt to prohibit, through involuntary servitude, all prospective forms
of slavery "akin to African slavery." This would have forced the courts to
apply the Thirteenth Amendment, and its sweeping prohibition of slavery and
involuntary servitude, in a much broader range of cases. Congress, however,
chose to limit the scope of the Amendment, no doubt fearing the slippery slope
of a constitutional amendment with the breadth to touch the most sacred of
social institutions, the relationship between man and woman in marriage.
Such a narrow perspective on the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition
against involuntary servitude ignores history, which demonstrates that slavery
was much more than the coercion of economically productive labor.50 To
focus only on the economic aspect of slavery as a system of production in the
public sphere is to remove slavery from its hellish private context. Given
Congress's intention to abolish anything "akin to African Slavery," it is
necessary to examine the services performed by African Americans under
chattel slavery and to discern the potential breadth of the meaning of
involuntary servitude."' This examination can justifiably be confined to the
services provided by women who labored under this system. Their services
included not only those that could have been provided by substitute wage labor,
but also sexual and reproductive services that clearly fell outside the
wage-labor system.5 2 While it is indisputable that all slaves, regardless of
50. Historical scholarship on slavery is extensive. A sample of sources consulted for this article
follows: JOHN BAYLISS, BLACK SLAVE NARRATIVES (1970); JOHN W. BLASSINGAME, THE SLAVE
COMMUNITY: PLANTATION LIFE IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH (1972); SLAVE TESTIMONY: TwO CENTURIES
OF LETTERS, SPEECHES, INTERVIEWS, AND AUTOBIOGRAPHIES (John W. Blassingameed., 1976) [hereinafter
SLAVE TESTIMONY]; STANLEY ELKINS, SLAVERY: A PROBLEM IN AMERICAN INSTITUTIONAL AND
INTELLECTUAL LIFE (1968); STANLEY FELDSTEIN, ONCE A SLAVE: THE SLAVE'S VIEW OF SLAVERY
(1971); ROBERT W. FOGEL, WITHOUT CONSENT OR CONTRACT (1989); ROBERT W. FOGEL, TIME ON THE
CROSS: THE ECONOMICS OF AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVERY (1974); ELIZABETH FoX-GENOVESE, FRUITS OF
MERCHANT CAPITAL (1983); ELIZABETH FOX-GENOVESE, WITHIN THE PLANTATION HOUSEHOLD (1988);
EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE (1974) [hereinafter ROLL,
JORDAN, ROLL]; EUGENE D. GENOVESE, THE WORLD THE SLAVEHOLDERS MADE: TwO ESSAYS IN
INTERPRETATION (1969); EUGENE D. GENOVESE, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SLAVERY (1965); HERBERT
G. GUTMAN, SLAVERY AND THE NUMBERS GAME: A CRITIQUE OF TIME ON THE CROSS (1975); GERDA
LERNER, BLACK WOMEN IN WHITE AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (1972); JAMES MELLON,
BULLWHIP DAYS: THE SLAVES REMEMBER (1988); ORLANDO PATTERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY (1982); KENNETH STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION (1956); DEBORAH G.
WHITE, AR'N'T I A WOMAN?: FEMALE SLAVES IN THE PLANTATION SOUTH (1985). See also infra note
52, describing sexual exploitation of female slaves.
51. Justice Brennan in his concurrence in United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 961 (1988),
suggests that one must return to slavery to determine the coercion contemplated by the Amendment.
52. Historians who have examined the extent to which female slaves were used for the purposes of
breeding to increase the wealth of their masters have tended to focus their inquiry on whether breeding
operations, such as those used to breed farm animals, were common. See, e.g., FOGEL, WITHOUT CONSENT
OR CONTRACT, supra note 50, at 151-152 (there was no large-scale breeding of slaves).
This focus ignores the fact that forced breeding was common to slavery, but through a different
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their sex, were potential, if not actual, willing and unwilling participants in
chattel breeding, it is equally indisputable that African American women were
forcibly used by their masters for sex and that this represented one way in
which they were forced to reproduce.
Given that the courts have found that Congress intended the Thirteenth
Amendment to prohibit anything with the characteristics of chattel slavery and
that there is ample evidence that the sexual exploitation of women slaves was
a recognized evil of the chattel slavery system, coerced sexual services,
whether for pleasure or profit, should be considered as falling within the scope
of the involuntary servitude prohibition. This is true even though there are no
explicit references in the debates on the Thirteenth Amendment to a specific
intention to protect female slaves from sexual exploitation.
To understand this, one must recognize that members of Congress did not
need to recite the particulars of the evils of slavery to justify the Amendment.
This can be explained by placing the debates in historical context. By the time
of the debates, slavery had existed as a legal institution for almost two hundred
years. Attempts to abolish it or to protect it had been common to the nation's
politics for many years.5" By the mid-eighteen hundreds, the abolitionist
movement and the question of whether slavery should be abolished pervaded
the American consciousness.
Pamphlets, 4 books 5 , newspapers 6 and speeches 7 provide a glimpse
method: the wide-spread rape of female slaves by masters and others. Although there is no estimate of the
"increase" created in this manner, there is such overwhelming evidence that it took place with frequency
that the numbers must have been high. See Judy Scales-Trent, Black Women and the Constitution: Finding
Our Place, Asserting Our Rights, 24 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 9, 26 ("[Black women] ... performed
a reproductive function which was crucial to the economic interests of the slaveholders."); OCTAVIA
ALBERT, THE HOUSE OF BONDAGE OR CHARLOTrE BROOKS AND OTHER SLAVES 72, 120 (1988) (Slave
named Hattie had three children by master's son. Slave was daughter of the master and was sold to other
slaveholder "to be his kept woman"); Frederick Douglass Discusses Slavery, in A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE NEGRO PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES 309, 313 (Herbert Aptheker ed., 1951) (On December
8, 1850, Frederick Douglass stated, "more than a million women ... through no fault of their own, [are]
consigned to a life of revolting prostitution ... slave breeding is relied upon ... [every slaveholder is
•.. a guilty party ... he deserves to be held up before the world as the patron of lewdness. . ."); SLAVE
TESTIMONY, supra note 50, at 156, 221, 400, 474-475, 506, 540, 703 (slave testimony on sexual
exploitation of female slaves by slaveholders); LINDA BRENT, INCIDENTS IN THE LIFE OF A SLAVE GIRL,
26-27, 51-66, 82-92 (1861) (autobiographical accounts of her sexual exploitation by her master); L. MARIA
CHILD, AN APPEAL IN FAVOR OF AFRICANS 23 (1968) (Reveals sexual exploitation of female slaves and
concludes that it is "betrayed by the amount of mixed population"); MELVIN DRIMMER, BLACK HISTORY:
A REAPPRAISAL 167 (1968) (instructions from master to agent on treatment of "breeding wenches");
FELDSTEIN, supra note 50, at 128-134 (1971) (sexual exploitation of female slaves); FOGEL, WITHOUT
CONSENT OR CONTRACT, supra note 50, at 181-182 (High rates of slave children with white fathers);
FoX-GENOVESE, WITHIN THE PLANTATION HOUSEHOLD, supra note 50, at 188-191, 294 (Sexual
exploitation of female slaves); GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL, supra note 50, at 413-431 (Sexual
exploitation of female slaves); MARTHA GRIFFITH BROWNE, AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A FEMALE SLAVE 175
(1875) (Recounting a slaveholder saying, "'[b]ut I wants her fur my own use; a sorter private gal .
Ihie gave a lascivious blink .... Oh God! .. .Sold! and for such a purpose!").
53. See generally DONALD 1. ROBINSON, SLAVERY IN THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICS 1765-
1820 (1971). Comments made by James Madison at the Constitutional Convention on July 14, 1787
indicated Madison's view that the "real difference" between the North and the South was "[tihe institution
of slavery and its consequences." Id. at viii.
54. See PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY IN THE COURTROOM: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF
AMERICAN CASES (1985), in which the author provides a six-page list of pamphlets used as sources for
Beyond Metaphor
into the content of the public debate. It is in these works and not Congressional
debate that one finds evidence of the conditions of slavery. These conditions
were known to the public and the Thirty-Ninth Congress when it decided to
abolish the legal institution of African-American chattel slavery. Within this
context, members of Congress did not need to describe what they sought to
abolish. The word "slavery" itself evoked a shared national consciousness of
its horrors, including sexual exploitation for the pleasure of slave-owners and
their financial benefit. Even if Congress did not explicitly state that the
Thirteenth Amendment prohibited the sexual exploitation of African-American
women, it is highly likely that they knew this was one of the consequences of
the chattel slavery system.
To fully understand the potential reach of the Thirteenth Amendment's
prohibition, it is best to dispense, if only for a minute, with the mind's attempt
to define slavery and to permit the soul to explore the horror of what it meant
to be owned as human property. The owner of human chattel could freely use
this human property as she or he would any other piece of property, animate
or inanimate. Although there were some legal sanctions against certain
egregious acts, such as unjustified murder of a slave, they were seldom
enforced and had little if any impact on slaveholders' conduct.5" Their
freedom was essentially unbridled.
As important as legal ownership was, the slaveholders' belief in their moral
right of ownership, in their natural superiority, and in the African-Americans'
natural inferiority provided the justification for daily degradation and
subjugation. Thus, the system of American slavery is best understood as the
absolute control by white slaveholders over all aspects of the lives of their
slaves. This is not to diminish the ways in which the slaves manifested their
free will, but rather to acknowledge the legal right and the power of the
slaveholders to attempt to break it and to supplant it with their own.
Understood in this way, the concept of the servitude contemplated by slavery
as being just like that exchanged by the free worker for wages becomes absurd.
The owner of humans was free to demand whatever she or he pleased, and
what pleased was not confined to existing market equivalents. Thus, along with
forced economic production and domestic tasks, with their obvious counterparts
in the free wage-labor system, came other personal services such as sex and
the bibliography and the title page from the SLAVE RIOT AND TRIAL OF ANTHONY BURNS (1854), a
pamphlet recounting the trial of Anthony Bums, a fugitive slave, and the public reaction to the enforcement
of the Fugitive Slave Act. Id. at ii, xiii-xix.
55. See, e.g., HARRmT BEECHER STOWE, UNCLE TOM'S CABIN (Alfred Kazin ed., Bantam Books
1981) (1852). Uncle Tom's Cabin was the "greatest fiction success of the nineteenth century." Id. at vii.
56. DOCUMENTS OF UPHEAVAL: SELECTIONS FROM WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON'S THE LIBERATOR,
1831-1865 (Truman Nelson ed., 1966). William Lloyd Garrison was a well known abolitionist who
published The Liberator, one of the most widely circulated of the abolitionist newspapers.
57. See, e.g., Frederick Douglass' speech of Dec. 8, 1850, supra note 52; see generally FREDERICK
DOUGLASS, MY BONDAGE AND MY FREEDOM (1855).
58. DANIEL J. FLANIGAN, THE CRIMINAL LAW OF SLAVERY AND FREEDOM: 1800-1865 at 145-167
(1987).
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reproduction.
Furthermore, there were services demanded through coercion that should
be categorized as such, but which are more typically thought of as aspects of
the coercion itself. For example, splitting families, 9 removing children,
controlling food, water, medical care, movement, formal education, religion,
and familial affiliation are all coercive techniques. They involve services of
the body, mind, heart and spirit, all outside the bounds of the free marketplace,
but completely and legitimately within the private sphere of the master/slave
relationship. Viewed in historical context, the concept of the servitude
embodied in the Thirteenth Amendment is an expansive one with roots in both
the public and private spheres.
Congress recognized that the system of absolute control existing in slavery
flowed from the legal status of slaves as chattel. Thus, when Congress
prohibited slavery, it started from the premise that one person should not be
permitted by law to own another. But Congress also recognized that, even
without the imprimatur of the state, an evil similar to slavery could exist. The
system of chattel slavery provided proof of the abuses springing from the
actual ownership of, or the belief in the right of domination over, other human
beings. The nature and level of coercion used against slaves was violent and
horrific. It included deprivation, beatings, maimings, whippings, rape, murder,
torture, starvation and the ever present threat of any or all of them. In
addition, it included the constant threat and actual separation of mothers from
children and other family members from one another.
Congress sought to abolish not just slavery, but the characteristics of
slavery created through coercion. Thus, in adopting the Thirteenth
Amendment, Congress not only forbade the legal ownership of human chattel
(slavery) but prohibited anyone from treating another as if such ownership
existed (involuntary servitude). The Thirteenth Amendment sought to preserve
the tenet of free will and prohibited the use of coercion sufficient to break it.
B. Lives as Cases: Involuntary Servitude
In the previous section, I argued that Congress knew of both the economic
and social aspects of slavery as well as slavery's parallels to the husband/wife
relationship. In this section I examine criminal involuntary servitude cases
which were prosecuted under the federal criminal statutes enacted to implement
the Thirteenth Amendment.' By looking at these cases, I seek to reveal both
59. Families were divided for different reasons. The sale of slaves away from their families was often
used as punishment. Upon the death of a master and distribution of the estate, slave families were separated.
See, e.g., M'Vaughters v. Elder, 4 S.C.L. (2 Brev.) 307, 314 (1809), in which the court stated that the
children of both slaves and horses were to be treated as the "increase" of animals and therefore as part
of the estate to be distributed among the heirs.
60. This article focuses exclusively on cases prosecuted under criminal statutes enforcing the Thirteenth
Amendment because they provide the most detailed guidance to conditions, caused and maintained through
threats of or actual physical violence, found sufficient to constitute involuntary servitude. These cases share
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the nature of the master/servant relationships and the servitudes coerced that
are regarded as within the scope of the Amendment. The courts have addressed
explicitly the issue of whether certain servitudes have been provided
"involuntarily." But they have been silent as to why the master/servant
relationship before it or the servitude coerced were "servitudes" contemplated
by the Thirteenth Amendment. The effect of this has been that "involuntary
servitude" has been discussed by the courts as a unitary concept. To collapse
the two words in this way, however, elides their distinct meanings and
obscures their significance. A review of the criminal involuntary servitude
cases reveals that when treated as a unity, involuntariness becomes the focus
of judicial inquiry and servitude is ignored. As a result, free will and its
negation have been the focus of the last half century of criminal cases
enforcing the Thirteenth Amendment. So while these cases clarify the kinds
of conditions as well as the legal standard that will satisfy the first element of
"involuntariness," a discussion of the kinds of services that have been accepted
by the courts to satisfy the requirement of the second element "servitude" is
absent. Thus, this section begins with an examination of the legal standard of
coercion and then turns to a review of the salient facts which have been found
implicitly to constitute a servitude prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment.
In 1987, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in United
States v. Kozminski,6' "to resolve the conflict among the Courts of Appeals
on the meaning of involuntary servitude for the purpose of criminal prosecution
under § 241 and § 1584. "62 In fact, the inquiry was limited to the types of
coercion embraced by the definition of the word "involuntary." The case was
only tangentially concerned with the services provided by those held in
involuntary servitude. The boundaries of the debate were drawn by the Second
and Ninth Circuits as to whether physical force, legal coercion, or threats of
either were required to render a service involuntarily provided63 or whether
psychological coercion alone was sufficient." Judge Friendly for the Second
with battering cases the use of force by a private individual against another. Other cases in which practices
have been alleged to violate the Constitution's prohibition against involuntary servitude, but not the criminal
statutes, typically involve circumstances that are non-violent and concern legal coercion. See, e.g., Garcia
v. United States, 421 F.2d 1231, 1232 (5th Cir. 1970) (ordering taxpayers to pay taxes and penalties to
United States government does not violate the Thirteenth Amendment), cerr. denied, 400 U.S. 945 (1970);
Wicks v. Southern Pacific Co., 231 F.2d 130, 138 (9th Cir. 1956) (union security agreements creating
"closed shops" do not violate the Thirteenth Amendment), cert. denied sub non. Wicks v. Brotherhood
of Maintenance of Way Employees, 351 U.S. 946 (1956); United States v. United Mine Workers, 89 F.
Supp. 187, 190 (D.C. 1950) (anti-strike injunctions do not violate the Thirteenth Amendment); Trustees
of California State Colleges v. Local 1352, San Francisco Fed'n of Teachers, 13 Cal. App. 3d 863, 867
(lst Dist. 1970); Jefferson County Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 463 S.W. 2d 627, 630 (Ky. Ct. App.
1970) (teachers anti-strike laws do not violate the Thirteenth Amendment), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 865
(1971); Clark v. Clark, 278 S.W. 65, 68 (Tenn. 1925) (court order to pay alimony does not violate the
Thirteenth Amendment); Turner v. Unification Church, 473 F. Supp. 367 (R.I. 1978) (cult "brainwashing"
does not constitute involuntary servitude), aff'd, 602 F.2d 458 (2nd Cir. 1979).
61. 487 U.S. 931 (1988).
62. Id. at 939.
63. United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d. 475 (2nd Cir. 1964).
64. United States v. Mussry, 726 F.2d. 1448 (9th Cir. 1984).
1992]
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
Circuit had held in Shackney that threats of or actual physical coercion were
required to support a finding of involuntary servitude, while Judge Reinhardt
for the Ninth Circuit had held in Mussry that psychological coercion alone
could be sufficient to break another's will.
In Shackney, Judge Friendly concluded that the use or threatened use of
law or physical coercion, such as beatings and physical barriers to leaving,
were essential to a finding of slavery or involuntary servitude.65 He concluded
that there was insufficient evidence of such coercion where a farmer recruited
and paid for the transportation of a man and his family from Mexico to work
on his farm." Once on the farm, the family lived in a corrugated metal shed
without lights, heat or plumbing.67 The farmer isolated the family on the
farm. Although the man ran errands in town for the farmer, the man and his
family were not permitted to come and go freely. The farmer threatened them
with deportation, belittled their work and according to the man and his family
created an atmosphere of fear sufficient to make them believe that they could
not leave and that they must continue to work for the farmer."' The key
factors missing from this portrait were physical violence or threats of physical
violence and physical barriers to leaving.69 The Court rejected the threat of
deportation as a threat of the use of legal sanction because it was merely the
threat to send the workers back to their country of origin and there was no
evidence that somehow this would be equivalent to "imprisonment or
worse. "70 Judge Friendly reversed the conviction and held unequivocally that
without evidence of physical or legal coercion there could be no involuntary
servitude. 7
For the next twenty years, there was no significant departure from Judge
Friendly's coercion formula requiring at least threats, with the apparent ability
to carry them out, or the actual use of legal sanction or physical harm. Then
the Ninth Circuit in Mussry,72 departed from the other circuits and concluded
that psychological coercion could be just as effective at breaking another's
will.73 It reversed the dismissal of all counts of the indictment not supported
by allegations "that the defendants used, or threatened to use, law or force. ""'
The Court of Appeals did not make factually clear where threats or use of
force or legal sanction were missing, and it provided only a general description
of the living conditions of those alleged to have been held in involuntary
65. 333 F.2d at 486-87.
66. Id. at 486, 477-78.
67. Id. at 478.
68. Id. at 479.
69. Id. at 486.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 487.
72. 726 F.2d. 1448. The defendants were indicted under U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, 18 U.S.C. §§
371, 1581, 1583, 1584. 726 F.2d. at 1450.
73. Id. at 1455-56.




In Mussry, the defendants had recruited Indonesians, none of whom spoke
English, to come to the United States to work as undocumented workers in
their homes. The defendants paid the servants wages higher than those they
would have received in Indonesia, but far below the United States minimum
wage. The defendants withheld the servants' passports and return airline tickets
and required them to work to pay off the costs of their transportation to the
United States. The servants worked fifteen hours per day, seven days per
week, cleaning, cooking, massaging, and performing other services. All lived
in the defendants' homes. While some left the homes apparently without
retaliation, others made no attempt to leave.76 Apparently, viewing the
government's claims in the context of the psychological climate created by the
defendants, the court of appeals found these allegations sufficient to warrant
the indictment. In interpreting the scope of the term "involuntary servitude"
as included in the Thirteenth Amendment and Section 1584, the court
concluded that "[a] holding in involuntary servitude occurs when an individual
coerces another into his service by improper or wrongful conduct that is
intended to cause, and does cause, the other person to believe that he or she
has no alternative but to perform labor."' To determine whether the
coercion, however caused, was sufficient to break another's will, the Court
advised that one had to ask whether the coercion would have had that effect
on a "reasonable person of the same general background and experience.""
Thus, rather than limiting coercion to prescribed forms, the Court looked at
the totality of the circumstances and then employed a modified objective
standard.
Writing for the majority in Kozminski, Justice O'Connor adopted the
requirement of threats of or actual physical or legal coercion and rejected the
Mussry court's psychological coercion standard.79 In Kozminski, two
mentally-retarded men had worked on the Kozminski's dairy farm, one since
1967 after he had been picked up by Mrs. Kozminski when she found him
walking along the side of the road, and the other since the early 1970s, when
Mr. Kozminski found him in a nearby city. 0 Both men had worked on the
farm seven days a week, seventeen hours per day. At first they were paid
fifteen dollars per day; later they received no pay at all. The trial court found
that the farm family and their other hired hands physically and verbally abused
the men, and that the men lived in squalid conditions without adequate food,
housing, clothing or medical care. Furthermore, the men were isolated. They
were not permitted to talk to other people, including their relatives. They could
75. Id. at 1453-54.
76. Id. at 1454.
77. Id. at 1453.
78. Id.
79. 487 U.S. at 952-53.
80. Id. at 934-35.
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not leave the farm and remained there until another worker contacted county
officials and they were placed in adult foster care."'
The Supreme Court, in holding that the use or threatened use of physical
or legal coercion is a necessary element of involuntary servitude under the
Thirteenth Amendment and its enforcing statute Section 1584, rejected the
position that the term prohibited "the compulsion of services by any means
that, from the victim's point of view" leaves the victim with no alternative but
to serve.12 The Court noted that if psychological coercion alone were
sufficient to establish the element of involuntariness, the determination of the
sufficiency of the coercion would be entirely subjective, dependent solely on
the defendant's state of mind. Such a purely subjective standard, reasoned
Justice O'Connor, would make ambiguous the nature of the conduct
criminalized; individuals could become the victims of arbitrary prosecution and
would have no certainty as to what conduct was expected of them. The Court
suggested that a standard allowing for the subjective experience of
psychological coercion could criminalize "a broad range of day-to-day
activity."83 It provided as an example that a parent who threatened to
withdraw affection from a child unless she or he agreed to work in the family
business would be prosecutable under the Thirteenth Amendment's criminal
enforcing statutes. 4 Interestingly, this example suggests an expansion of the
Thirteenth Amendment into private family relationships with market attributes.
Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment in an opinion joined by Justice
Marshall. 5 Justice Brennan advocated an alternative position: that the
involuntary servitude clause prohibits any means of coercion that succeeds in
breaking another's will such that she or he is reduced to a condition of
servitude resembling that of a chattel slave." While he found psychological
coercion alone to be too broad, he reasoned that a standard combining coercion
with conditions similar to those of chattel slavery would be sufficiently limited
and capable of evaluation by a jury. This "comport[ed] better with the evident
intent of Congress."87 Curiously, when Brennan provided factual examples
of why the psychological coercion test alone was too broad, he included
examples of services that were clearly outside of the employer/employee
context:
[o]ne can. . . imagine troublesome applications of that test such as.
. . the religious leader who admonishes his adherents that unless they
work for the church they will rot in hell, or the husband who relegates
81. Id.
82. Id. at 949.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 953 (Brennan, J., concurring).
86. Id. at 962-64.
87. Id. at 953.
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his wife to years of housework by threatening to seek custody of the
children if she leaves. Surely being unable to work in one's chosen
field, suffering eternal damnation, or losing one's children can be far
worse than taking a beating, but are all these instances of involuntary
servitude?"8
Brennan suggested that the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment was broad
enough to encompass several kinds of relationships, including that of husband
and wife. One can draw this conclusion because it was not the relationships
with which Brennan was concerned, but rather with the term "servitude."
Brennan noted that servitude is qualitatively different than service; the former
"denotes a relation of complete domination and lack of personal liberty
resembling the conditions in which slaves were held prior to the Civil War."89
Despite the clarity of this statement, Brennan's opinion as to what the
Thirteenth Amendment could permit is unclear. After the above statement, he
uses the word "labor," which can be interpreted as referring to public sphere
labor; then, he repeats his broad definition of servitude; finally, he includes
in a footnote that "slave-like conditions can presumably ... be contrasted with
the conditions normally implicated by 'the right of parents and guardians to
the custody of their minor children or wards.'"90 Despite this ambiguity, it
appears as if Justice Brennan did not restrict the Thirteenth Amendment to the
public sphere, because in his view the conditions of servitude, rather than the
sphere or relationship in which they occurred, were more important to the
determination of whether the Amendment applied. The conditions had to be
slave-like and, for purposes of Section 1584, had to include the intent to coerce
others to perform a service involuntarily.9
Justice O'Connor rejected Brennan's formula, arguing that it did not
provide the degree of certainty that the majority favored.92 Her reasoning,
however, focused only on the ambiguity of the coercion, not of the servitude.
Thus, through Kozminski the Court implicitly ratified previous cases in which
involuntary servitude had been based upon physical or legal coercion or threats
of either, but left open the question of whether the Thirteenth Amendment
servitudes could include traditional private-sphere "familial" relationships.
A review of relevant cases provides further insight into the nature and level
of coercion sufficient to establish involuntary servitude, the nature of the
services actually provided, and the type of relationship between the coercer
and the coerced. In addition, the cases demonstrate two well-settled principles
of involuntary servitude: (1) a relationship freely entered into can convert to
one of involuntary servitude, and (2) where the level of coercion meets the
88. id. at 960.
89. Id. at 961.
90. Id. at 962-63 & n. 10, quoting Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 282 (1897).
91. Id. at 964-65.
92. Id. at 951.
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legal standard, the mere fact that one held in involuntary servitude does not
avail herself or himself of an opportunity to escape does not defeat a finding
that the person is held in involuntary servitude. All of these cases involve a
successful criminal prosecution under a variety of the Thirteenth Amendment's
criminal enforcing statutes. They all include physical violence, threats of
physical violence, or threats of arrest or deportation. Two cases involve forced
or attempted forced prostitution; one invloves domestic service; the others
involve agricultural work.
In the first of the prostitution cases, Aurelia P. Bernal recruited Rosenda
Nava, a domestic worker, to work at Bernal's hotel by offering higher wages
than she had been receiving.9 The hotel was a long distance from where
Nava was working when Bernal recruited her. When Nava arrived at the hotel,
she discovered that it was a house of prostitution and that Bernal expected her
to prostitute herself as well as to perform various household services. When
Nava refused to prostitute herself, Bernal detained her until she paid off her
transportation costs. After noting that Bernal had kept Nava under constant
surveillance and had threatened to contact the immigration service to imprison
and deport her, and despite citing evidence that Nava was able to leave the
hotel to perform errands in town, the Fifth Circuit upheld Bernal's conviction
for peonage.94 The decision was influenced by Nava's relative isolation, in
spite of evidence that she had managed to send a note to a relative. For her
crime, Aurelia P. Bernal was sentenced to two and one-half years.
In another prostitution case,9" Joel Thomas Pierce posted bond for female
prisoners in exchange for their services and lured others to work for him as
waitresses, hostesses, bartenders and prostitutes.96 He regularly beat the
women if they refused to prostitute for him; he did not let them leave; he
threatened them with further physical abuse; and he did not clear their debts,
no matter how much they worked or earned.97 Pierce was convicted of seven
counts of peonage.9" He was sentenced to eighteen months imprisonment and
a $500 fine for each count. The Fifth Circuit found the evidence of coercion,
service, and alleged debt sufficient to support a conviction for peonage, the
"status or condition of compulsory service or involuntary servitude based upon
a real or alleged indebtedness."" The Fifth Circuit thus affirmed the
conviction on all but one count.'O'
Domestic service has also led to a conviction under the Thirteenth
Amendment. In a 1947 case, Elizabeth and Alfred Wesley Ingalls, the
93. Bernal v. United States, 241 F.2d 339, 341 (5th Cir. 1917), cert. denied, 245 U.S. 672 (1918).
94. Id.
95. Pierce v. United States, 146 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1944), cen. denied, 324 U.S. 873 (1945). This
case was prosecuted under 8 U.S.C. § 56 and 18 U.S.C. § 444. 146 F.2d at 86.
96. Id. at 84.
97. Id. at 85.
98. id. at 84.
99. Id. at 86.
100. Id. at 86.
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employers of a domestic worker, were denied a new trial and their conviction
for slavery was permitted to stand.'"' For more than twenty-five years, Dora
L. Jones, an African American woman, had worked for them as a servant
performing all of the household labor, "drudgery of the most menial and
laborious type. "102 For most of those twenty-five years she received no
wages, no days off, and no vacations. She was given substandard food and
accommodation. The Ingalls isolated her from relatives and friends and forbade
her to leave the household except on errands. Jones was at times physically
abused, and when she protested her living conditions and threatened to leave,
Mrs. Ingalls reminded her of the "adulterous relationship" that she had had
with Ingalls' first husband." 3 The "relationship" had resulted in pregnancy
and Jones had had an illegal abortion. Mrs. Ingalls used this to threaten Jones
with arrest and imprisonment and also told her that if she were not sent to
prison she would be sent to a mental institution because she was too stupid to
make her way in the world. Jones believed all of this and remained "against
her free will" until the defendant's daughter convinced her to escape." 4 In
the presence of police, the defendant wife renewed her threats to the victim
and others who had helped in the escape. Jones believed the threats and
returned to the defendant. It is unclear how Jones finally escaped.
Ingalls was convicted at trial of inducing Jones to move to her home, with
the intent of keeping her as a slave. The district court denied her motion for
a new trial.
The remaining involuntary servitude cases resulting in convictions involved
agricultural workers. In 1977, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the involuntary
servitude convictions of defendant crew leaders and their employees. 05 The
defendants, Ivory Lee Wilson, Roscoe Wilson, and William Bibbs controlled,
isolated, and physically abused four men."° They controlled where the men
lived, what and where the workers ate, and charged the workers for everything
they used or ate, thereby keeping them in debt. 7 The defendants forced
back at gunpoint two employees who had attempted to escape. The defendants
refused to let them leave until they paid off their debts. Others tried to escape,
but were captured and beaten. It was a common practice for workers to be
beaten and forced to work the next day. After a beating in which his arm was
fractured and his back injured, one worker returned to work the following day
because he believed he would be killed if he did not. Upholding the
involuntary servitude convictions, the court reasoned that even though the
employees could have escaped, their fear of being punished, along with the
101. United States v. Ingalls, 73 F. Supp. 76, 79 (S.D. Cal. 1947).
102. Id. at 77.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. United States v. Bibbs, 564 F.2d 1165 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1007 (1978). This
case was prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1584. 564 F.2d at 1166.
106. Id. at 1166.
107. Id. at 1167.
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pervasive physical violence used by the crew leaders, realistically barred
escape. 10'
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit upheld the convictions of Tony Booker, the
operator of a migrant agricultural labor camp, and J.D. Rollins and Tony
Gibson, two of his henchmen, of holding two men in involuntary
servitude. " The defendants had transported the two workers from another
state to the camp. The two men worked intermittently and the defendants
withheld all of their wages. The defendants carried and openly displayed guns
and severely beat other workers." 0 On one occasion, two men attempted to
go to the grocery store without permission. The defendants followed them, beat
them with their fists and an axe handle, choked them, cursed at them, and
threatened them with serious physical abuse and death if they tried to leave
again.11 Ultimately, the workers left with Farm Workers' Legal Services,
but they refused medical attention because of their fear of the defendants.' 2
The Fourth Circuit found that farmworkers were held in involuntary
servitude in another case. 3 The defendants, John Harris, Dennis Warren,
and Richard Warren, controlled migrant workers in an agricultural labor camp.
They guarded the workers at night, returned them to the farm if they tried to
escape, subjected them to physical violence to prevent them from leaving or
to force them to work faster, and confined them in a "jail" as punishment."
4
One worker died because he was refused medical assistance. The court found
that such conditions constitute involuntary servitude."
5
These cases involving the criminal enforcement of the Thirteenth
Amendment reveal the coercion required to establish involuntary servitude.
There is no question that physical violence, such as beatings with fists or
weapons, or threats of physical violence with the apparent ability through
strength or weapons to carry out the threats, constitute sufficient coercion to
meet the element of involuntariness. In all of the cases, the person held in
involuntary servitude initially entered the relationship voluntarily. In addition,
although Judge Friendly" 6 found that the apparent opportunity to escape
because of the lack of physical barriers indicated a lack of sufficient coercion,
all the other cases imply or make explicit that neither physical barriers nor
failed escape attempts are required to establish a case of involuntary servitude.
In addition, while all of the cases discuss deprivation and isolation as part of
the typical context of involuntary servitude, none require these elements to be
108. Id. at 1168.
109. United States v. Booker, 655 F.2d 562 (4th Cir. 1981). The defendants were convicted under
18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1583. 655 F.2d at 564.
110. Id. at 563.
111. Id. at 563-64.
112. Id. at 564.
113. United States v. Harris, 701 F.2d 1095 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1214 (1983). Three
managers of a migrant labor farm were convicted under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1584. 701 F.2d at 1097.
114. Id. at 1098.
115. Id. at 1100.
116. United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1964).
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present to find that an individual is being held in involuntary servitude.
II. THE BATTERED WOMAN
A. History, Society, and Battering
The battering of women in intimate relationships is an enormous social
problem rooted in the patriarchal power of men. While each woman is battered
as an individual, her condition is shared by many. The status of womanhood
renders her physically and emotionally vulnerable to violence at the hands of
the man she loves. In this section, I describe the historical and social context
of battering in order to address more fully the question of whether a particular
batterer holds his partner in involuntary servitude.
The terms used to name the problem, its victim/survivors, and its
perpetrators are varied. Battered women are also referred to as abused women
and battering is referred to as domestic violence, family violence, spousal
abuse, wife abuse, and wife beating.""I Because this article is concerned with
women who are coerced through physical violence or threats of physical
violence to provide services they do not choose to provide, the term battering
is used throughout to describe the use of physical violence in an intimate
relationship by a batterer to control his partner."1 Although some experts
believe "battering" includes a single slap or shove, the kind of battering
explored here is characterized by escalating violence over a period of time,
including the degradation and isolation of the woman being battered.
Battering of women by men in intimate relationships is a significant social
problem.1 9 Studies indicate that from fifty to sixty percent of married
117. See generally JULIE BLACKMAN, INTIMATE VIOLENCE: A STUDY OF INJUSTICE (1989); NAMING
THE VIOLENCE: SPEAKING OUT ABOUT LESBIAN BATTERING (Kerry Lobel ed., 1986); MIRIAM HIRSCH,
WOMEN AND VIOLENCE (1981); LENORE WALKER, THE BAT-rEREDWOMAN (1979); R. EMERSON DOBASH,
VIOLENCE AGAINST WIVES (1979); SUZANNE K. STEINMETZ, THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE (1977); DEL
MARTIN, BATTERED WIVES (1976); ERIN PIZZEY, SCREAM QUIETLY OR THE NEIGHBORS WILL HEAR
(1974).
118. See WALKER, supra note 8.
119. MURRAY A. STRAUS, RICHARD J. GELLES, & SUZANNE K. STEINMETZ, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS:
VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY (1980). The authors estimate that battering occurs at some point in
28 % of all marriages. Id. at 32. They also estimate that 1.8 million married women are battered each year.
Id. at 40. These estimates are limited to physical battering and do not include cases of psychological abuse.
As with estimates of crimes generally, these statistics must be understood as reflecting a much larger
number that go unreported.
Sisterhood Is Global describes the problem through the use of multiple statistics that evoke its tragedy,
enormity, and social cost:
Approx. 2 million-6 million women each yr. are beaten by the men they live with or are married
to; 50-70% of wives experience battery during their marriages; 2000-4000 women are beaten
to death by husbands each yr.; in 1979, 40% of all women who were killed were murdered by
their partners ... 25% of women's suicide attempts follow a history of battery; wife battery
injures more US women than auto accidents, rape or muggings; every 18 seconds a woman is
beaten by her husband severely enough to require hospitalization (1983). Police spend 1/3 to 1/2
of their time responding to domestic violence calls; 97% of spouse abuse is directed against
wives. Battery is a cross-class, cross-race problem.
SISTERHOOD Is GLOBAL 703-4 (Robin Morgan, ed., 1984).
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women in the United States experience some form of spouse abuse. 120
Although battering cuts across socio-economic and racial lines,121 it is often
inaccurately perceived as more common in the lower socio-economic class. 1
22
This presumption stems from the fact that women from this class have fewer
resources and are therefore more likely to come to the attention of the legal
and social service systems.' 23
Battering results in a range of physical injuries, from slight injuries to those
requiring medical treatment or hospitalization, to those ending in death.
1 24
Nearly one third of the homicides of women are committed by the victim's
husband or boyfriend. 1" In addition, because battering may begin with or
escalate during pregnancy, 126 physical injuries to the woman can result in
other physical harm to the fetus, including premature birth and
miscarriage. 27 Battering also often includes violent sexual assaults. 28
Embodied in the definition of battering is the concept that the batterer is
acting violently not only out of rage, but also out of the desire "to coerce [the
woman] to do something he wants her to do without any concern for her
rights. "129 Thus, from this definition of battering the concept of coerced
services emerges. Of course, the exchange of freely given services is part of
every relationship. For example, parties to intimate heterosexual relationships,
symbolized by the marriage relationship, expect reciprocal services that are
commonly gender differentiated. Social norms would have women provide
household services, childcare and the cluster of services embodied in the
concept of conjugal fellowship: love, affection, sex and reproduction.
Reciprocally, norms would have men provide financial security, household
maintenance and conjugal fellowship.
120. ROGER LANGLEY & RICHARD LEVY, WIFE BEATING: THE SILENT CRISIS 12 (1977).
121. U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE FINAL REPORT, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE 11 (1984) [hereinafter TASK FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE REPORT].
122. Dr. F.G. Bolton Jr. takes this position in The Domestic Violence Continuum: A Pressing Need
for Legal Intervention, 66 WOMEN LAW. J. 11, 13 (1980). See Mary E. Combo, Comment, Wife Beating:
Law and Society Confront the Castle Door, 15 GONZ. L. REV. 171, 175 (1979). See also TASK FORCE
ON FAMILY VIOLENCE REPORT, supra note 121, at 11.
123. But see WALKER, supra note 8, at 14-16.
124. DOBASH, supra note 117, at 238. Table 8 specifies the extent and nature of battered women's
injuries.
125. TASK FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE REPORT, supra note 121, at 11 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, F.B.I., UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR 1983 (1984).
126. WALKER, supra note 8, at 51; Richard J. Gelles, Violence and Pregnancy: A Note on the Extent
of the Problem and Needed Services, 24 FAM. COORDINATOR 81, 81-82 (1975).
127. In some studies, 40% of the battered women interviewed reported being battered during
pregnancy. Diane Bohn, Domestic Violence and Pregnancy, J. NURSE-MIDWIFERY, March-April 1990,
at 86, 88-91 (1990); Judith McFarlane, Battering During Pregnancy: 7 1p of an Iceberg Revealed, 15(3)
WOMEN & HEALTH 69, 71-72 (1989).
128. DAVID FINKLHOR & KERSTI YLLO, LICENSE TO RAPE: SEXUAL ABUSE OF WIVES 6-7 (1985)
(one out of ten wives has been sexually assaulted at least once by her husband). DIANA RUSSELL, RAPE
IN MARRIAGE, 87-101 (1990); M. Faulk, Sexual Factors in Marital Violence, MED. ASPECTS OF HuM.
SEXUALITY, Oct. 1977, at 30. At common law a man could not rape his wife. This principle was embodied
in the law of rape until very recently. Irene Henason Frieze, Investigating the Causes and Consequences
of Marital Rape, 8 SIGNS 532, 532-33 (1983).
129. WALKER, supra note 117, at xv.
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As the third party to a legal marriage, the law formalizes these norms.
Divorce cases involving child support and visitation demonstrate the law's
gendered expectations. 130 Generally, women are assumed to have provided
housework and child care and men are assumed to have provided the bulk of
the family income."' These normative expectations of intimate hetereosexual
relationships are very resistant to change. For example, in households where
both husband and wife hold full-time jobs outside the home, the wife continues
to shoulder a disproportionate share of the housework. 132 In most
relationships these services are provided voluntarily as part of an implicit
agreement between partners and, to some degree, there is reciprocity.
While services in most intimate relationships are provided voluntarily,
services in battering relationships frequently are not. Although it is impossible
to set forth a profile of the typical batterer,133 these men generally seem to
believe more strongly than non-violent men in traditional gender roles. They
emphasize a man's right to a woman's services, including sex, and the right
to obtain these services through violence. 134 Outbreaks of violence in
battering relationships are triggered when the batterer believes that the woman
has failed to serve him in the way he deserves and desires. Battered women
report battering triggered by trivial events such as forgetting to buy cigarettes
or by wanting to watch a different television channel.13
These women also report being battered to engage in sexual intercourse
and other sexual acts against their will. 136 Ten percent of the women in one
survey who had ever been married had been sexually assaulted by their
husbands. 137 In another study, one out of every three battered women had
been raped by her batterer.131 Sex is frequently the most significant service
in the battering relationship; it becomes symbolic of the man's total domination
of the woman. 39 Research on marital rape reveals that it most often occurs
"in the context of an exploitative and destructive relationship" 140 and that
130. See generally Karen Czapanski, Child Support and Visitation: Rethinking The Connections, 20
RUTGERS L.J. 619 (1989).
131. Id.
132. See generally ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING PARENTS AND THE
REVOLUTION AT HOME (1989).
133. See DEL MARTIN, BATTERED WIVES 45 (1976) ("[iln the professional social-science literature,
little concrete data on the batterer is to be found.").
134. Del Martin, author of BATTERED WIVES, supra note 132, testified before the United States
Commission on Civil Rights on battering as an extension of the patriarchal structure of intimate
hetereosexual partnerships, such as marriage. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, BATrERED WOMEN: ISSUES
OF PUBLIC POLICY 5 (1978).
135. FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra note 128, at 24.
136. Id. at 18.
137. Id. at 6-7. See also RUSSELL, supra note 128, at 57 (reporting that 14% of 644 women who had
ever been married reported at least one completed or attempted rape by their husbands or former husbands).
138. RUSSELL, supra note 128, at 61.
139. ELIZABETH A. STANKO, INTIMATE INTRUSIONS 9 (1985) ("Women's experiences of... battering
[andi rape ... become the sources for documenting all women's actual and potential experiences....
In each case, a woman endures an invasion of self, the intrusion of inner space, a violation of her sexual
and physical autonomy.").
140. FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra note 128, at 18.
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the sexual violence is "only peripherally about sex."' 4 ' Between fifty and
eighty-seven percent of women who have experienced rape in an intimate
relationship such as marriage indicate that they had been sexually assaulted at
least twenty times by their partners. 42 In addition, battered women report
being forced to submit to sexual acts other than vaginal intercourse. In one
study alone, one-third of the women reported forced anal intercourse. 
43
The batterer's belief in a man's right to chastise his partner and to coerce
sexual services remains entrenched in the law.'" The law expects both
partners to provide sex and reproductive services. A spouse's refusal to have
sex or to have children is a valid reason for divorce or annulment. 45 So
central are these services to the marital relationship that one court would not
honor an antenuptial agreement where the contracting spouses agreed not to
have children, in part because "the right to normal and proper sex relations
is implicit in the marriage contract."t6
Courts will not enforce contracts for sexual services. 47 However, unlike
other spousal services, without the invalidation of marital rape exemption laws,
a husband can get what amounts to specific performance of sexual services by
the use of physical force.'48 While a husband cannot sue a wife for specific
performance of her services generally,'49 the legal system, by not allowing
a wife to press criminal charges against her husband for rape, de facto supports
the husband's right to sexual services within marriage.' 50 Due to the
141. Id. Catharine MacKinnon disagrees with this characterization. Instead, she argues that "[s]o long
as we say that those things are abuses of violence, not sex, we fail to criticize what has been made of sex,
what has been done to us through sex, because we leave the line between rape and intercourse, sexual
harassment and sex roles.., exactly where it is." CATHARINE MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED
86-87 (1987).
142. FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra note 128, at 23.
143. Id. at 28.
144. Chastisement in the law is traced to the late 1400s when Friar Cherubino of Sienna in his Rules
of Marriage instructed husbands that when a wife committed an offense against her husband, he should
"Isicold her sharply, bully and terrify her. And if this still doesn't work ... take up a stick and beat her
soundly .... " Thereafter, laws throughout Europe made women the property of their husbands. By the
1700's Blackstone wrote, "[flor, as he is to answer for her misbehaviour, the law thought it reasonable
to intrust him with this power of restraining her, by domestic chastisement, in the same moderation that
a man is allowed to correct his apprentices or children .... " 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
443.
145. HOMER CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, §13.3 at 504 (2d
ed., Student ed. 1988).
146. Height v. Height, 187 N.Y.S.2d 260, 262 (N.Y. App. Div. 1959).
147. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976); Lovallo v. Guerrera, No. 093735, 1991 WL 61420
(Conn. Super. Ct. April 11, 1991); Thomas v. La Rosa, 400 S.E.2d 809 (W. Va. 1990).
148. Judge Scalera, in granting a husband's motion to dismiss an indictment for the rape of his wife
of the New Jersey Superior Court, recognized this when he wrote, "Rape subjugates and humiliates the
woman, leaving her with little retaliatory capability save that provided by law . . . State v. Smith, 372
A.2d 386, 390 (Essex County Ct. 1977).
149. Courts refuse to order specific performance in any labor contract precisely because of the
Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition against involuntary servitude. Arthur v. Oakes, 63 F. 310, 317-318
(7th Cir. 1894); Beverly Glen Music, Inc. v. Warner Communications, Inc., 224 Cal. Rptr. 260, 261 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1986)(citing Poultry Producers v. Barlow, 189 Cal. 278, 288 (1922)).
150. As of 1986, over thiry-five states maintained some form of the marital rape exemption. Nearly
one quarter of the states regarded unmarried cohabitors as married for the purpose of the marital rape
exemption. Note, To Have and To Hold: The Marital Rape Exemption and the Fourteenth Amendment, 99
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overwhelming gender specificity of rape as a crime of violent sexual
domination of women by men, there is no specific performance analogy for
women, even though they are equally entitled to the husband's sexual services.
While sex and reproduction are entitlements in marriage, the husband is in the
unique position of being able to enforce the entitlement through violence. It
is not surprising then that many battered women are subjected to forced sex
and that the batterers view sex as an essential service of right.,'
Despite the law's recent movement toward recognizing the equality of
women, cultural beliefs about men's rightful domination over women
persist.'52 While sexual coercion is an excellent example of this domination,
it is not the only one. The inability of many battered women to escape their
abusive situations is another powerful manifestation of the batterer's belief in
his right to coerce his victim. In one study, 68% of the battered women
reported feeling trapped.'53 In addition, batterers seek out battered women
wherever they go, even when they have attempted to terminate the relationship
and have moved out of the shared residence. In fact, many marital rape cases
involve rapes committed after the parties have stopped living together. 54
These phenomena, as well as the rate at which temporary restraining orders
are violated, demonstrate that batterers believe that their rights of domination
over the women they batter should not be interfered with, even by the law. 155
Battering is not simply violence, it is violence used as a tool to effect total
domination of a woman by a man. Thus, it is common to find that the most
basic aspects of battered women's lives are controlled. For example, batterers
often attempt to control the woman's access to others by isolating her.
156
This ranges from stopping women from seeking medical care to prohibiting
them from seeing family members. The attempts to dominate a woman can
take many forms, from controlling access to food or money to threatening
children with abuse. Battered women are threatened by their batterers with the
loss of their children through custody battles or removing the children to
unknown places.' 57 The cumulative effect of all of these coercive techniques
is to reinforce the ultimate power of the man over the woman.
The following accounts of three battered women's experiences provide
HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1260 (1986). See infra note 237 and accompanying text.
151. RUSSELL, supra note 128.
152. See STRAUS, GELLES & STEINMETZ, supra note 119, at 242.
153. Suzanne Prescott & Carolyn Letko, Battered Women: A Social Psychological Perspective, in
BATTERED WOMEN 72, 84 (Maria Roy, ed., 1977).
154. Shunn v. State, 742 P.2d 775 (Wyo. 1987); State v. Smith, 426 A.2d 38 (N.J. 1981); People
v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567 (N.Y. 1984).
155. See generally Gary R. Brown, Battered Women and the Temporary Restraining Order, 10
WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 261 (1989). For a discussion of the limitations of protection orders, see Peter Finn,
Statutory Authority in the Use and Enforcement of Civil Protection Orders Against Domestic Abuse, 23
FAm. L.Q. 43 (1989).
156. See, e.g., MARTIN, supra note 133, at 84.
157. Naomi Cahn, Civil Images of Battered Women: The Impact of Domestic Violence on Child
Custody Decisions, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1041 (1991).
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specific examples of the patterns described above. They have been selected
to illustrate the degree to which particular battered women are subjected to
ongoing abuse, including the coercion of services in a context of degradation
and subjugation. These stories detail cases of involuntary servitude.
B. Lives as Cases: Battering
1. Judy Norman
58
Judy and John Norman were married for twenty-five years and had five
children."5 9 Five years after they were married, John Norman began beating
his wife and forcing her to work as a prostitute to support them. When she
begged him not to force her to work, he beat her. If she failed to earn the $100
per day that he required of her, he beat her. In fact, he beat her almost every
day for twenty years using a variety of implements ranging from his fists to
a baseball bat. When Judy was pregnant with their last child, he beat her and
kicked her down a flight of stairs. The child was born prematurely the next
day. In addition to the beatings, John used other physical and psychological
torture. He extinguished cigarettes on Judy's skin, refused to let her eat for
days at a time and regularly called her a "dog," a "bitch" and a "whore."
To degrade her he made her bark and eat pet food out of the pet bowls and
sleep on the concrete floor. He frequently threatened to kill her, to cut her
breast off and to cut her heart out."6°
Whenever Judy tried to leave, he found her, took her home and beat her.
She believed that she could not escape and feared his retaliation for her
attempts. In the twenty-fifth year of their marriage, Judy shot her husband dead
while he was napping. The events immediately preceding his death demonstrate
his coercion of her and her provision of services to him. Given the history of
battering in their relationship, it is possible to speculate that these events were
characteristic of the abuse.
Thirty-six hours before his death, John forced Judy to prostitute
herself. 6' He came to the place where she was working, beat her with his
fists, slammed her into the car door and threw hot coffee in her face. That
night he was arrested for drunk driving and kept overnight in jail. When he
was released he went home and beat Judy throughout the day. He forced her
to make him a sandwich and he then threw it on the floor and ordered her to
make another one. She made a second sandwich and he did the same, ordering
her not to touch the next one. She made a third sandwich and carried it to him
158. State v. Norman, 366 S.E.2d 586 (N.C.Ct. App. 1988), rev'd, 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C., 1989) (All
subsequent references are to the North Carolina Court of Appeals decision, 366 S.E.2d 586).
159. 366 S.E.2d at 587.




with a paper towel, but he took it and smeared it in her face., 2
That evening the police responded to a domestic violence report and found
Judy bruised and crying. 63 She told the police that John had been beating
her throughout the day. They advised her to take out a warrant, but she told
them that she was afraid that he would kill her if she did. Later that evening,
she took an overdose of drugs. John would not permit the emergency medical
personnel to treat her, and a police officer had to intercede to have her taken
to the hospital. John told Judy that she deserved to die and that he would give
her more pills to make her die. He also threatened to kill her mother and
grandmother.1"
Judy went to the hospital but spent the night at her grandmother's
house. 6 ' She returned home the next day. Again, John beat her throughout
the day. He forced her to drive him and his friend on an errand. While she
was driving he slapped her, poured a beer on her head, kicked her in the side
of the head, and threatened to "cut her breast off and shove it up her rear
end." ' After they returned home, he continued the beating, smashed food
in her face, put a cigarette out on her chest, threatened to cut her throat, to
cut off her breast, and to kill her. He forced her to lie on the floor and he lay
down on the bed to nap. After he fell asleep, one of their daughters entered
the bedroom and asked her mother to take care of her baby. When the baby
began to cry, Judy became alarmed that it would wake up John, so she got up
and took the baby to her mother's house. There she found a gun, returned to
the house and shot John.
67
Two experts testified in her criminal trial as to whether Judy Norman fit
the profile of a battered woman. One testified that this case went beyond
battering and had become "torture, degradation and reduction to an animal
level of existence, where all behavior was marked purely by survival ...
"168 The expert testified further that Judy believed that escape was
impossible.' 69 The expert found her situation to be much like that of a
prisoner of war and that she justifiably believed that the only way to escape
to protect herself was to kill him. 70 The second expert testified that Judy
suffered from "abused spouse syndrome" and that she reasonably believed that
it was necessary for her to kill her batterer to ensure her own survival.' 7 '
Judy Norman was indicted for first degree murder. She was convicted at
trial of voluntary manslaughter and was sentenced to six years in prison. The
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 588.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 588-89.
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North Carolina Court of Appeals granted a new trial, but the Supreme Court
reversed, characterizing her fears as "indefinite . . .concerning what her
sleeping husband would do at some time in the future. " 172
2. Pamela Fielder'7'
Pamela and Darwin Fielder had been married for three years when Pamela
Fielder shot her husband. 74 They had both worked throughout their
marriage, and they had no children. Darwin Fielder was an
obstetrician/gynecologist and Pamela was a real estate broker with her own
business. The marriage was characterized by escalating physical and sexual
abuse. 
175
At the start of their marriage, Pamela consented to "playful" sexual
"bondage and discipline" games. 76 However, after a short period of time,
the severity of the sado-masochistic games grossly exceeded the level to which
she willingly consented. " Darwin converted a utility closet in their house
into a torture chamber equipped with rings with which to shackle his wife. He
used handcuffs, shackles, leather straps, metal rings, pinchers, bull rings, a
discipline helmet, a metal collar, a leather hood, a bullwhip, a riding crop, a
gag, and a chair that fit over the head so that a person could defecate onto the
wearer's face. To force Pamela to engage in the sado-masochistic acts, he
injected her with drugs. While she was in a drugged state, he pierced her
genitals with a ring and hung her from large metal rings, nude, shackled and
tied. 7 1 In addition to the use of drugs, he threatened her with the knowledge
that if he chose to, he could perform a vulvectomy on her as he allegedly had
on another woman. 79 When she refused to comply with his sexual requests,
he hurt her physically and once left her hanging in the utility closet, unclothed
and shackled for an entire day. When she hid some of the sexual equipment,
he beat her and threatened to kill her if she told anyone of his activities. When
she threatened to leave him, he told her that there was no place that she could
hide where he could not find her." °
Several months before Pamela killed her husband, he agreed to a divorce
under the condition that he maintain complete control over the process in order
to ensure that she would not reveal his sexual proclivities or his coercive
172. 378 S.E.2d 8, 14 (N.C. 1989).
173. Fielder v. State, 683 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985), rev'd 756 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. Crim. App.
1988).
174. 756 S.W.2d at 310.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 311.
177. The Court stated, "[tihese games ... crossed into the realm of what would clearly be, to the
average person, a nightmare of sado-masochism." Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 314.
180. Id. at 311.
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sexual conduct.'' He ordered her to use the same attorney as he did and to
consult the attorney only in his presence. On the day before she killed him,
she went to see another attorney. On the attorney's advice, she returned to the
house and packed the equipment to take to the attorney's office. She was so
terrified, however, that she left the equipment packed in the closet."t 2
The next day she went to her husband's new apartment to discuss the
divorce.'83 There she discovered that he was having an affair. She returned
to their house and he followed. Enraged, he ordered her to fix him a drink,
and she refused. They fought, and she told him that she had gone to see
another attorney. He panicked, assuming that she had told the attorney about
his sexual practices, and ran for the utility closet. She ran for the back door,
but he caught her and pushed her onto the floor screaming, "I've told you; I've
told you," meaning that he would kill her for revealing his sexual conduct to
the attorney.'" He reached into a cabinet, pulled out Pamela's pistol, and
banged it down on the table toward her.' She grabbed the gun, he moved
toward her, and the gun went off. He got his hands around the pistol and it
fired seven times, killing him.'8s
Pamela Fielder was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and sentenced to
two years in prison.8 7 The prosecution asserted that she willingly
participated in the sexual activities and that she killed her husband not in
response to physical and sexual abuse, but rather in a jealous rage upon
discovering that her husband was having an affair.' She was not permitted
to introduce expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome at trial. The
appellate court held that, given Pamela Fielder's history of physical and sexual
abuse, it was reversible error to exclude expert testimony by a psychologist
regarding the reasonableness of her fear.'89 The Court of Criminal Appeals
subsequently reversed her conviction due to the exclusion of this testimony and
remanded for a new trial.19
3. Sheri Boyd' 9'
From the beginning of his relationship with Sheri Boyd, Earl Boyd was
181. Id.
182. Id. at 311-312.
183. Id. at 312.
184. Id.
185. Id. Pamela Fielder testified, "I knew [this meant] he was going to kill me." Id.
186. Id. at 310.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 313. The Court noted that "[t]he State's entire case was devoted to depicting [Pamela
Fielder's] version of the facts and of her role in her marriage to Darwin as implausible." Id.
189. Id. at 321.
190. Id.
191. The woman whose life is revealed here requested that pseudonyms be used to protect her identity
and those of her children. The facts presented here are from a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. A copy
of the Petition along with Ms. Boyd's affidavit with all identifying information deleted is on file with the
author.
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possessive, jealous, and physically abusive. 92 He began to slap her very
early in their relationship. In January 1977, Sheri Boyd became pregnant, but
because of Earl's abusive behavior she did not marry him until July 1977. The
day they were married, Earl told Sheri, "You're mine now, bitch." From that
point on, both his possessive and violent behavior increased drastically. 93
His possessive behavior manifested itself in a variety of ways. He isolated
Sheri from her family and friends by not allowing her to see them, to talk with
them or to correspond with them. 94 He forced Sheri to stay in the house
unless she was out with him. He insisted that she keep her eyes averted when
riding with him in the car, so that she could not look at men on the street. He
constantly accused her of seeing other men and called the house eight times
a day to be certain she was there. He controlled her in other ways as well. He
forced her to dress the way he wanted, did not permit her to wear make-up,
fixed her hair and did not allow her to go to the obstetrician until she was
seven months pregnant. 19 5
Over the course of their relationship his physical abuse of her became more
intense and occurred more often."96 He slapped her, hit her, and shoved her
into walls, leaving bruises. He often carried out his physical attacks against
Sheri during drinking binges. In her eighth month of pregnancy, she and her
daughter by a previous marriage, attempted to move in with her mother to
escape Earl's beatings. Her mother refused and advised her to make her
marriage work. The abuse, however, continued. Once, Earl held his gun to
her head and pulled the trigger over and over again. The gun was empty, but
Sheri did not know it at the time.' 97 On another occasion, in a mad rage, he
forced open the bedroom door that Sheri had locked to protect herself. 9 '
Earl's abuse was not only directed at Sheri, but also at to her five year-old
daughter.' He verbally assaulted the child and kept her isolated from the
rest of the family by making her eat in a separate room, away from everyone
else.
Earl was also extremely sexually abusive." ° He often forced Sheri to cut
him with objects, to watch pornographic movies, and to engage in sexual acts
that were painful and degrading. Once, he jammed his thumb into Sheri's
shoulder leaving a permanent indentation and scar. He also forced her to
engage in public acts of degradation, such as dressing up in a black bikini and
high heels to serve as a party hostess for his friends.20'
192. Petition at 5.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 6.
195. Affidavit at 3, 5.
196. Petition at 5.
197. Affidavit at 2.
198. Petition at 5.





In addition to this abuse, Earl Boyd initiated and frequently repeated a
murder-suicide ritual with his loaded gun.2 2 He would begin by telling Sheri
that, if the two of them died together, they would be together forever. She
would then beg him not to kill them and, eventually, he would set the loaded
gun down and walk away. He then would order Sheri to bring him the gun.
She routinely obeyed him, and he would unload it. This ritual occurred
throughout their marriage, but happened more frequently during the six weeks
after their son's birth. During that six-week period, Earl Boyd started to extend
the death threats to their newborn son and to Sheri's daughter. In those last
weeks, he threatened to take his life and the lives of his family two or three
times a week.2 3
One day he initiated this ritual with several significant deviations.' 4 It
began with Earl arguing about money for Christmas and escalated to the point
where he pulled out his gun and threatened to kill Sheri and the children. This
time however, he deviated from the ritual and cocked the gun. Sheri got down
on her hands and knees and begged him not to kill them. Eventually, he put
the gun down on the living room floor. He then called to Sheri to bring him
his gun to unload; when she brought him the gun, he did not exhibit the
relative calm that he usually did at the end of the ritual. Rather, he reinstated
the argument over the Christmas money and demanded the cocked gun. Sheri
was so disoriented by his renewed anger that she was unable to determine
whether he intended to unload the gun or to kill them all. When she handed
him the gun, it went off.05 He died shortly thereafter. His ability to isolate
Sheri had been so complete that there were no witnesses to his violence. When
the ambulance arrived the day he was shot, the next door neighbor, having no
idea that Sheri had given birth six weeks earlier, assumed that Sheri had gone
into labor.' °
Sheri Boyd was convicted of first degree murder in 1978 and is currently
serving a sentence of life imprisonment.2 7 No evidence of her abuse was
adduced at trial and accordingly no theory of self-defense was presented to the
jury.
20 8
III. BATTERING AND THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT
A. Lives and Legal Doctrine
In this section I compare the lives of the three battered women described
202. Id. at 6-7.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Affidavit at 6.
206. Id. at 3.
207. Petition at I.
208. Id. at 20-26.
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in the previous section to those lives described in the criminal involuntary
servitude cases. Through this process I seek to reveal the similarities between
the cases which were found to violate the criminal prohibitions against
involuntary servitude and those of these three battered women. Ultimately, I
argue that the similarities are legally significant.
Judy Norman was beaten and threatened by her husband regularly over a
twenty-year period. His techniques of control included physical torture, ranging
from the infliction of physical pain to the control of basic needs such as eating
and sleeping. He also used psychological abuse to degrade her. When she
attempted to escape he found her, beat her, and forced her to return. A
comparison of the level of physical violence in this case to that found in the
involuntary servitude cases demonstrates that the violence used against Judy
Norman was equal to or greater than the level of violence or threats of
violence that has been determined sufficient to break another's will.
John Norman used these techniques throughout the marriage to force Judy
Norman to work as a prostitute and to give him the money she earned. In the
battering incident immediately preceding John Norman's death, he forced her
to perform domestic services for him as well. Forced prostitution is within the
scope of the Thirteenth Amendment, at least where the service is not provided
directly to the coercer, but is instead used as a means of generating income.
As discussed previously, there are two cases of criminal involuntary servitude
in which the service provided was prostitution." °9 There is also a case in
which the services provided were domestic in nature.2"' Although there is
not a recounting of the domestic services performed by Judy Norman over the
years, it is reasonable to conclude, given what we know about expectations
of services in marriage generally and in battered women's marriages
specifically, that she performed at least some domestic services for her husband
involuntarily as a result of his coercion of her.21" '
While the similarities between Judy Norman's case and the involuntary
servitude cases are evident, Pamela Fielder's case presents less immediately
clear analogies. At first glance, the nature of the coercion used by her husband
appears atypical of the involuntary servitude cases. Pamela Fielder was
shackled, locked in a room, injected with narcotics, and threatened with
maiming, and ultimately, death. Upon a closer examination, however, the
shackles and other mechanical restraints, as well as the use of the utility closet
as a place to confine her, have their equivalents in the involuntary servitude
cases.
209. Bernal v. United States, 241 F. 339 (5th Cir. 1917), cert. denied, 245 U.S. 672 (1918) and Pierce
v. United States, 146 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 873 (1945).
210. United States v. Ingalls, 73 F. Supp. 76, 79 (S.D. Cal. 1947).
211. To speculate in this way about what a particular battered woman did in her relationship is justified
in light of the sociological study completed by Arlie Hochschild in which she finds that the overwhelming
majority of women, battered or not, provide domestic services to their husbands and families. See
HOCHSCHILD, supra note 132, at 276 and accompanying text.
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The use of these tools both coerced and restrained Pamela Fielder no less
than the beatings, weapons and the use of the "jail" in the involuntary
servitude cases. The various forms of restraint, the maiming and threats of
maiming, the use of narcotics, and the threats of death created a context within
which the attempt to escape would appear to a reasonable person to be
extremely risky. In the involuntary servitude cases, courts have clearly
considered the context of fear created by threats of and actual use of physical
violence and restraint, to explain why the victim did not seize opportunities
to escape. 12 Although none of the criminal involuntary servitude cases have
addressed directly whether narcotics are considered a weapon, it is reasonable
to conclude that where they are used as a physical means of coercion, and thus
serve the same function as a weapon, they will be legally recognized as such.
Finally, Darwin Fielder's threat to maim his wife was clearly one that he
had the ability and power to carry out. While no criminal involuntary servitude
case has dealt precisely with maiming or threats thereof, the concept of
physical coercion is sufficiently broad to include such conduct. Although some
of Darwin Fielder's threats to kill were not accompanied by the presence of
a weapon, the involuntary servitude cases embrace the idea that the context
within which the threat occurs can render the threats as coercive as if they had
been accompanied by a weapon.213 Thus, the threats and physical coercion
used against Pamela Fielder would meet the standard of conduct applied in the
involuntary servitude cases.
The services provided involuntarily by Pamela Fielder as a result of the
coercion are more difficult to reconcile with the criminal involuntary servitude
cases because her services were entirely sexual and she provided them directly
to her husband for his pleasure. Pamela Fielder's case is distinguishable from
the two involuntary servitude cases involving prostitution, as the women in
those cases were forced to have sex with men other than their batterers for
profit. While the cases of both Judy Norman and Pamela Fielder force a direct
confrontation with Congress' original intent that the Thirteenth Amendment
not disturb the traditional rights of husband over wife, Judy Norman's case
comes closest to the two prostitution cases. In contrast, Pamela Fielder
involuntarily provided sex to her husband-exactly the kind of coercion found
in marital rape, which still is not universally recognized as a legal wrong.214
212. U.S. v. Harris, 701 F.2d 1095 (4th Cir. 1983).
213. See West, supra note 12, at 93, 97-101, in which she discusses the context of fear within which
battered women live. West argues that the "near-universal response to the pervasive fear with which a
battered woman lives is to redefine herself as a giving rather than a liberal self." Id. at 99. The giving
self is "other-regarding" rather than "self-regarding and rational. Women who define themselves in this
way "consent to transactions, changes, or situations . . . so as to satisfy not their own desires or to
maximize their own pleasure, as liberal legalism and liberal legal feminism both presume, but to maximize
the pleasure and satiate the desires of others . . ." Id. at 93. A battered woman "consents to everything,
absolutely, and at all levels of being, and she does so for the subjectivity of the other, and the survival
of herself." Id. at 99.
214. This argument is dealt with in more detail in the discussion of the judicial reasoning supporting
the abrogation of the marital rape exemption. See infra text accomanying notes 232-47.
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Given the history of coerced sexual services in slavery, however, and the
resulting argument that such services should be included in the definition of
involuntary servitude, it follows that the services Pamela Fielder provided
should also fall within the definition of servitude. The growing abrogation of
the marital rape exemption further supports this position.
Another issue focused sharply by the Fielder case is whether Pamela
Fielder's voluntary entry into marriage and initial voluntary participation in
the sexual conduct should preclude a claim of involuntary servitude. The
reasoning of the courts in the involuntary servitude cases is uniform on this
point: even though a service is provided initially of one's own free will, once
the coercion meets the legal standard to render one's service involuntary, there
is a claim of involuntary servitude. Accordingly, while at the beginning of her
marriage Pamela Fielder participated in the sexual acts voluntarily, at some
point her participation became involuntary. A similar issue regarding the
transformation of voluntary sex to involuntary sex is at the heart of the marital
rape exemption.
Sheri Boyd's case raises many of the issues also raised in the previous two
cases. For example, the level of coercion used against her ranged from threats
to the use of a loaded gun. That range of coercive behavior is clearly sufficient
to render her conduct involuntary. In addition, like Pamela Fielder, she was
forced to engage in sexual acts against her will.
Two significant aspects of Sheri Boyd's case distinguish it from those of
the other two women. First, while Judy Norman was forced to work as a
prostitute for money, Sheri Boyd was forced to degrade herself publicly by
dressing in a bikini and heels to entertain her husband's friends. Second, Sheri
Boyd's case is distinguished by the extent to which her husband isolated her
and controlled basic personal decisions in her life that the rest of us take for
granted. Both isolation and control, as demonstrated through the criminal
involuntary servitude cases, are frequently important coercive techniques that
serve not only to intimidate, but also to discourage escape. Furthermore, such
isolation and control are in themselves servitudes, because they require an
individual to give up basic rights of personal choice for another's pleasure.
In each of these battered women's cases, the level and nature of coercion
either equals or exceeds the coercion in the involuntary servitude cases. The
domestic and sexual services which the women in these cases provided for
profit have direct counterparts in the modern involuntary servitude cases, while
coerced sex for the batterers' pleasure does not. Rather, support for the
inclusion of coerced sex derives from the fact that the prohibition against
involuntary servitude legitimately includes this form of sexual exploitation, in
part because sexual exploitation of slave women directly by their masters was
characteristic of chattel slavery.
It must also be explored further whether it is legitimate to continue to limit
the legal theory of involuntary servitude to market relationships in the public
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sphere. While it must be acknowledged that Congress did not intend the
Thirteenth Amendment to reach into the private sphere of the family, it must
also be recognized that African-American chattel slavery, the likes of which
Congress sought to abolish through the Thirteenth Amendment, was not simply
a public-sphere market relationship. Both the laws of husband and wife and
of master and slave involved private-sphere relationships sharing similarities
that Congress understood. Given that contemporary law treated women and
family relationships as completely outside the public sphere, Congress'
absolutism is historically comprehensible."' The law has changed, however.
Just as the relationship between slave and master was both an economic and
a private social relationship, there is now support for the theory that the
intimate relationship between a man and a woman has both public economic
and private personal aspects. Finally, the reasons justifying the exclusion of
the marital relationship from the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibitions are
anachronistic.
B. Irrelative Dichotomies: Public and Private Spheres/Intimate and Stranger
1. Market Attributes of Intimate Relationships
In this section I develop further the dichotomy of the public and private
spheres described in the discussion of the historical and social context within
which Congress inscribed the words "involuntary servitude" into the text of
the Thirteenth Amendment. In the previous section the dichotomy was relevant
to Congress' simultaneous recognition and denial that the Thirteenth
Amendment could be interpreted as reaching into the marital relationship.
Here, in this first subsection, I demonstrate that the dichotomy is irrelevant
in light of market attributes of intimate relationships such as marriage.
The distinction traditionally drawn between the private and public spheres
is that the private sphere is comprised of familial non-market functions separate
from the market economy, while the public sphere is comprised of
marketplace, non-familial functions separate from family relationship. This
distinction blurs when viewed through the lenses of a variety of economic and
legal theories. As has been illustrated previously, the perspective that the
Thirteenth Amendment applies only to economic relationships in the public
sphere is based on the historically inaccurate characterization of slavery as a
purely economic system. This illustrates an initial weakening in the
interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment as a purely public sphere
prohibition.
A second weakness is the inaccuracy of the traditional characterization of
215. See Olsen, supra note 26, at 1510 ('the assertion that family affairs should be private has
been made by men to prevent women and children from using state power to improve the conditions of
their lives.")
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the family structure as purely private with no public sphere economic
dimension. This characterization is as inaccurate as the previously discussed
characterization of slavery as purely public. This section elucidates some of
the public sphere aspects of the non-wage services performed within the family
that are essential to the market economy to demonstrate the illogic of the
argument that the relationship should be excluded from the Thirteenth
Amendment's scope because it is not of the public sphere. It also explores two
ways in which the law turns to the public-sphere market to find equivalents
to services provided within the private sphere. The categorization of slavery
and the family into the two distinct spheres is a matter of analytic convenience
and does not necessarily reflect reality.
Economists have long argued that the marital relationship and the unpaid
services provided within in it by women are central to a capitalist economy
and are as much a part of the profit-generating work of the public sphere as
the work of the husband in the marketplace.2 16 The central argument
supporting the theory that unpaid household services have economic value is
found in economic critiques of the exclusion of such work from the Gross
National Product (GNP). As early as the 1910s, economists began to analyze
the effect of unpaid non-market work performed by women in the home on
the GNP.217 They found the calculation of the GNP to be inherently
inaccurate because of the exclusion of women's non-market work. They posited
that the calculation is flawed because when women enter the market and
receive wages which are included in the GNP, there is no calculation on the
other side of the ledger noting the loss in value of the services provided
previously at home. In other words, these economists theorized that the GNP
is inflated whenever women enter the paid workforce because there is no
subtraction of the "forgone nonmarket services." 21'
Economists of this school argue that these non-market services should be
measured by calculating the value of the forgone opportunity of working in
216. See generally Margaret Bentson, The Political Economy of Women's Liberation, in FROM
FEMINISM TO LIBERATION 199-210 (Edith H. Altbached., 1971); Jean Gardiner, Women 's Domestic Labor,
89 NEW LEFT REVIEW 47 (1975); Joan Landes, Wages for Housework: Subsidizing Capitalism?, QUEST:
A FEMINIST QUARTERLY, Fall 1975, at 17.
217. JUANITA KREPS, SEX IN THE MARKETPLACE: AMERICAN WOMEN AT WORK 67-68 (1971). The
GNP is the measure of the goods and services produced for purchase during a one-year period. Professor
Kreps, drawing from an address given by Sylva M. Gelber to the Canadian Department of Labour in 1970
entitled "The Labour Force; the GNP; and Unpaid Housekeeping Services," reviews proposals to include
unpaid domestic work in the GNP. In 1918 the National Bureau of Economic Research estimated the value
of services performed by "housewives" at one-fourth of the GNP. In the 1930's, Simon Kuznets found
the value to be "slightly" more than one-fourth. During the same period, "Swedish economists" proposed
valuing the work of wives and daughters by determining what domestics would be paid to provide the same
services. Other economists deplored the exclusion of household services from the GNP. In 1959, Colin
Clark proposed a method of imputing the value of such work in COLIN CLARK, THE ECONOMICS OF
HOUSEWORK: BULLETIN OF THE OXFORD INSTITUTE OF STATISTICS 20 (1958), cited in KREPS at 67-68.
See also GARDNER ACKLEY, MACROECONOMIC THEORY 55 (1961) (claiming that the exclusion was the
"source of a serious bias in the national product.") Finally, Professor Kreps notes that a 1968 study placed
the value "at about one-fourth of the GNP." Id. at 68.
218. KREPS, supra note 217, at 66.
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the marketplace for wages and that this should be reflected in the GNP. The
opportunity costs represent the wages that a rational person would choose to
forego to pursue the occupation of homemaker. These "opportunity costs" are
calculated for an individual woman by adding the number of hours she spent
in providing non-paid services and multiplying it by the average wage earned
by a woman of that particular age, education and employment history. The
aggregate "opportunity cost" of all women performing nonmarket services is
calculated by adding the number of hours spent in providing services multiplied
by the average wage earned by all women in particular age, education and
employment history categories multiplied by the total number of women in
non-market household work.219 Economically, the aggregate opportunity costs
represent the contribution of women to the market economy through their
unpaid domestic labor.
A woman's uncompensated services within the home inure to the benefit
of her husband's employer and the economy generally, as well as to the
economic and social well-being of the individual family unit. Women's private
sphere labor has market value separate from the GNP calculation, albeit
unrecognized and uncompensated. The employer benefits through the increased
job performance due to the wage-earner's ability to concentrate on the job
rather than on the other demands of maintaining a home and raising children.
The economy benefits because money that would be paid to purchase these
services can be saved by the family and would be available in the economy
for investment. According to this theory, the woman benefits ultimately in that
her standard of living rises along with the husband's greater earning
power. 220
In keeping with the economic theories that services provided within the
home have market value there are legal theories based on the assumption that
unpaid household services have economic value. Tort law recognizes damages
for domestic services and loss of consortium ,22t and equitable distribution
in divorce law demands that monetary value be attributed to a homemaker's
unpaid services.222 Under either of these theories market equivalents must
be established for these services.
Tort law is unique in recognizing damages for the loss of sexual and
relational services as well as household services.' Typically such damages
are sought in wrongful death actions or in cases of serious injury to a spouse.
219. Kreps notes that "[mlany questions can be raised regarding the foregoing calculations, not the
least of which are questions of the method and the validity of the data used." Id. at 73. She points out that
economists in particular would be disturbed by the fact that she did not account for the decrease in wages
that would be predicted when greater numbers of women enter the paid labor force.
220. See id. at 64-75.
221. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, TORTS 931-934 (5th ed. 1988).
222. Ealey v. Ealey, 596 A.2d 43 (1991); Mary Downey, The Need to Value Homemaker Services
Upon Divorce, 87 W. VA. L. REV. 115 (1984).
223. Dini v. Naiditch, 170 N.E.2d 881 (III. 1960); Lewis v. Hughes Helicopter, 220 Cal. Rptr. 615
(Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Medley v. Strong, 558 N.E.2d 244 (I11. App. Ct. 1990).
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Other than sexual and relational services, most services performed by women
within the private sphere have paid equivalents in the marketplace. 224
Evidence as to the market equivalents of the various services provided by a
woman guide the calculation of "replacement costs" by the courts. The
replacement costs are calculated by determining the cost of hiring others to
perform the tasks of the full-time homemaker.' Although services such as
sex and reproduction have their counterparts in prostitution 2' and
surrogacy,227 the courts typically do not turn to the market value of these
for guidance, but rather speculate as to their worth in computing damages for
loss of a wife or husband." That the market provides equivalents for
non-paid work within the private sphere delegitimates the distinctions drawn
between the private and the public spheres based on whether the work within
it is compensated or not.
In diverse ways and for diverse reasons, women's non-market work has
been the focus of efforts to attribute market value to it retroactively. Equitable
distribution is in fact retroactive or delayed compensation for a homemaker's
work. The property settlement is vested in the discretion of the judiciary, 9
which usually distributes the marital estate according to the contribution of the
parties, including the contribution of domestic services by the homemaker.?0
224. KREPs, supra note 217, at 67-8. Kreps points out that some work such as "companionship,
attention, interest in the family's welfare, [and] continuity of relationship with young children" are difficult
to attach a monetary value to.
225. Nancy R. Hauserman, Homemakers and Divorce: Problems of the Invisible Occupation, 17 FAm.
L.Q. 41, 49-51 (1973). Professor Hauserman points out the deficiencies in replacement costs although they
apply equally to the flaws inherent in opportunity costs. First, a homemaker provides many varied services
simultaneously. Second, the manner in which the task is categorized greatly changes its valuation:
babysitting versus early childhood education, short order cook versus chef, grocery shopping versus meal
planning by a dietician. Third, services such as love, stability, companionship, and sex are excluded from
the valuation. Fourth, fringe benefits are commonly not included. Id. at 50-51.
226. Jody Freeman, TheFeministDebateoverPrstitutionRefonn: Prstitutes'Rights Groups, Radical
Feminists, and the (Ia)possibility of Consent, 5 BERKELEY WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL. 75, 84 n.49 (1990).
Freeman quotes the English Collective of Prostitutes position "that 'for some women to get paid for what
all women are expected to do for free is a source of power for all women to refuse any free sex.'"
227. See, e.g., In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
228. For example, in New York, plaintiffs in wrongful death actions can recover only "fair and just
compensation for the pecuniary injuries resulting from the decedent's death to the persons for whose benefit
the action is brought." N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-4.3 (McKinney 1981 & Supp. 1992). One
New York court, in grappling with the value of a father's relationship to his children, stated, "I know of
no mathematical formula which I may employ in ascertaining the value of last parental guidance and
training." Rogow v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 547, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). Nevertheless, the court was
able to determine a "reasonable award" after an examination of the character of the father and the nature
of the father and child relationship. Id. at 562.
With regard to homemakers, there is wide recognition that the value of a wife and mother is impossible
to determine, and courts generally allow compensation in excess of replacement costs. Frances Jean Pottick,
Note, Tort Damages For The Injured Homemaker: Opportunity Costs or Replacement Costs? 50 U. COLO.
L. REV. 59, 67 (1978). See also Francis M. Dougherty, Annotation, Excessiveness or Adequacy of
Damages for Personal Injuries Resulting in Death of Homemaker, 47 A.L.R. 4TH 100 (1986).
229. Hauserman, supra note 225, at 48 (citing, Doris J. Freed & Henry H. Foster, Divorce in the
Fifty States: An Overview, 14 FAM. L.Q. 229, 246 (1981).
230. Hauserman, supra note 225, at 48 n.46. Professor Hauserman notes that the Uniform Marriage




Equitable distribution recognizes the value of a woman's work within the
home, compares it to the financial contribution of the wage-earning husband,
and attributes a comparative monetary value to it to determine what distribution
is equitable."
Retroactive or delayed compensation for non-market work is also part of
the social security system which provides women benefits based on their
husband's market work. Thus, women who have worked as unpaid
homemakers receive social security benefits derivatively from their spouses'
earnings records. Thus, just as in equitable distribution, the value of the
woman's private-sphere work is linked to the value of her husband's market
or public-sphere work. In effect, both equitable distribution and social security
benefits demonstrate the degree to which the dichotomy drawn between the
public and private spheres based on contributions to the economy are false.
Finally, there is an argument that governments should compensate women
for the work they do in their homes, thereby recognizing the contributions of
their labor to the economy. While such radical notions have never been
accepted in the United States, they have been adopted in other countries. While
it is difficult to imagine that such a policy would be adopted in the United
States, it is further evidence that the the public/private distinction is mutable.
2. Abrogation of Marital Rape Exemption
In this section, I explore further the false dichotomy of the public and
private spheres by examining the traditional marital rape exemption and the
trend to abrogate it. By doing so, I attempt to demonstrate in yet another way
both the original absurdity of the dichotomy and the current attempts to
delegitimize it. I demonstrate that when Congress recognized the legal and
factual similarity between slavery and marriage but pushed marriage safely
outside the reach of the Amendment, it did so by placing slavery in the public
sphere as a market relationship, and marriage in the private sphere. This
section argues that in light of the current trend to treat crimes such as rape
similarly whether or not they occur within the private sphere, it would be
unreasonable to continue to limit the Thirteenth Amendment exclusively to
public sphere conduct.
The law has evolved away from treating private sphere crimes, such as
battery and rape, differently from those committed in the public sphere. This
is due to the change in the social and legal status of women from legal
non-entities or chattel into autonomous individuals.2 This transition in the
status of women and the way in which it has altered the legal landscape of the
public and private is revealed in the national trend to abrogate the marital rape
231. See generally Hauserman, supra note 225.
232. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (marriage is a union, but of two indivduals who
remain autonomous after marriage); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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exemption. The marital rape exemption declares rape in marriage to be a legal
impossibility. 3 Historically, the exemption was justified on several different
legal theories of marriage. One, the chattel theory, was based upon the
conversion of a woman upon marriage into her husband's chattel to be used
as he willed. 4 The second, the contract theory, was grounded in the belief
that a woman contracted away her right to withdraw her consent to sex upon
marriage." The third, the unity theory, was premised on the theory that
upon marriage a woman's identity merged into her husband's, thereby making
rape an impossibility because a man cannot rape himself. 6 Perhaps more
than any other change in the treatment of crimes in the private sphere, the
change in the law's treatment of marital rape reveals principles for expanding
the traditional scope of the Thirteenth Amendment. Those states that have
wholly abrogated the marital rape exemption reject the principle that sexual
services are a right of marriage and, therefore, when not freely given can be
lawfully coerced by force. 7 Declaring coerced sex in marriage a criminal
act is based on the same moral grounds as classifying coerced services in
marriage as involuntary servitude.
While the marital rape exemption has its roots in the historic subjugation
of women, the courts trace the first explicit statement about rape in marriage
to Sir Matthew Hale, the Chief Justice of the Court of King's Bench from
1671-1675. On the impossibility of marital rape, he stated, "[The husband
cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by
their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up herself
233. See Michael D. A. Freeman, "But If You Can't Rape Your Wife, Who[m] Can You Rape?": The
Marital Rape Exemaption Re-examined, 15 FAM. L.Q. 1, 14-16 (1981).
234. Id. at 16.
235. Regina v. Clarence, 22 Q.B. 23 (1988) (woman brought husband to court for knowingly infecting
her with gonorrhea. She argued that had she known, she would not have consented to sex. The court
decided that because rape of one's wife was not unlawful, he could not be convicted); Regina v. Miller,
2 All E.R. 529 (1954) (filing for divorce did not revoke implied contractual consent to intercourse).
236. Warren v. State, 336 S.E.2d 221, 223 (Ga. 1985). Warren discusses these three theories of the
transformation upon marriage of women's status as alternative justifications for the origination of the marital
rape exemption. From a feminist perspective, the recent trend to regard marriage as a contract masks the
underlying reality that marriage is still a status relationship with its roots in patriarchal principles.
237. This is not to say that all states have abrogated the marital rape exemption. States that have
abrogated the exemption have taken differing approaches. For example, some states take the absolute
position that a husband can be found criminally liable for raping his wife, even while they are living
together. See Smith v. State, 401 S.2d 1126 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Warren v. State, 336 S.E.2d 221
(Ga. 1985); Commonwealth v. Chretien, 417 N.E.2d 1203 (Mass. 1981); People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d
567 (N.Y. 1984); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28.319, -320 (1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-5(b) (West 1982);
OR. REV. STAT. § 163.305 (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252 (Supp. 1991); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
940.225(6) (West 1982). Other states take the modified position that a husband can be found criminally
liable for rape only when the couple is living separately. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61B (Michie
1988). Other states require that there be a legal separation as well as a physical separation between the
husband and wife. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 18-6107 (1987). Finally, some states treat co-habiting partners
and voluntary social companions as married and therefore covered by the marital rape exemption. DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11 §§ 761, 773-775. See NATIONAL CENTER ON WOMEN AND FAMILY LAW, MARITAL
RAPE ExEMPTION (1991). See also Note, To Have and to Hold: The Marital Rape Exemption and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1255 (1986).
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in this kind unto her husband, which she cannot retract."238
Sir Hale made this statement three-hundred years ago without reference
to supporting authority, and states that have abrogated the marital rape
exemption regard Hale's proposition as anachronistic and as derived from, and
limited by, the law of marriage at the time the statement was made. 239 At
the time Sir Hale made his pronouncement, neither man nor woman could
legally revoke a marriage. However, given the difference in the legal and
social status of men and women at that time, men could for the most part alter
their marital relationship with impunity. But once married, a woman could
neither legally nor practically alter her status and could not, as Sir Hale said,
"retract" her perpetual consent to sex with her husband.
To support the abrogation of the marital rape exemption, the courts have
recognized that both the legal and social status of women has changed since
Hale's time. Marriages throughout the United States are revocable, and if
Hale's rule had any validity at the time he articulated it, this has long since
eroded.2' For example, three theories upon which the exemption was based
originally are no longer valid. First, women are no longer chattel. Thus, to
the extent that the marital rape exemption is based on the husband's right to
treat his chattel as he sees fit, the exemption is no longer valid. Second, if a
woman can break her marriage contract entirely through divorce, she should
be entitled to revoke a particular clause of the contract such as the consent to
sex. Third, the unity theory of marriage no longer applies, as women remain
autonomous individuals upon marriage.24 Thus, these theories no longer
form a basis for justifying the marital rape exemption.
The invalidity of these theories is further demonstrated by other changes
in the law as it affects women. These changes are due in large part to the law's
recognition of women as independent human beings with individual rights to
make independent choices. Women are no longer compelled by the law to
adopt their husband's surnames. In addition, by virtue of the Married Women's
Property Acts in the nineteenth century, women gained the right to sue, to be
sued, to contract, and to own property. In further recognition of the changes
in women's status and the importance of affording them rights of legal redress,
interspousal tort immunity is no longer operable in more than half of the
238. 1 Hale P.C. 629. Sir Hale was the Chief Justice Of the Court of King's Bench, 1671-1675. Sir
Hale provided no citation to precedent. The New Jersey Supreme Court, in the case in which it judicially
abolished the marital rape exemption, stated:
Thus the marital exemption rule expressly adopted by many of our sister states has its source
in a bare, extra-judicial declaration made some 300 years ago. Such a declaration cannot itself
be considered a definitive and binding statementof the common law, although legal commentators
have often restated the rule since the time of Hale without evaluating its merits ....
State v. Smith, 426 A.2d 38, 41 (N.J. 1981).
239. Id. See also Warren v. State, 336 S.E.2d at 223-24 (Ga. 1985).
240. State v. Smith, 426 A.2d 38 at 43 ("[t]he rule may simply not have been applicable to revocable
marriages, which exist today ... ).
241. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
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states.242 Rape laws are no longer written to protect the property of husbands
or fathers, but rather to protect the physical, erotional, and dignitary interests
of the woman. The law is less tolerant of the physical and sexual abuse of
women and recognizes that a woman's most fundamental right is the control
of her own body, a proposition which obviously extends to control of sex and
reproduction.243 Nowhere is this more pronounced than in the recognition
that forced sex is a violation of a woman's privacy because it is a violation of
her bodily integrity. This is also true in part because it can result in forced
conception." Accordingly, when equal protection challenges have been
mounted against rape statutes that are not sex neutral, some courts have found
no lack of equal protection where the physiological reality of rape is that men
rape women and that only women can become pregnant and thereby be forced
to begin the reproductive process.24 Women's right of reproductive choice
has been used to justify the abrogation of the marital rape exemption. The
argument is logical: If a woman has the right to decide when to conceive, she
242. Alabama (Penton v. Penton, 135 So. 481 (Ala. 1931)); Alaska (Cramer v. Cramer, 379 P.2d
95 (Alaska 1963)); Arkansas (Leach v. Leach, 300 S.W.2d 15 (Ark. 1957)); California (Klein v. Klein,
376 P.2d 70 (Cal. 1962)); Colorado (Rains v. Rains, 46 P.2d 740 (Col. 1935)); Connecticut (Silverman
v. Silverman, 145 A.2d 826 (Conn. 1958)); Idaho (Lorang v. Hays, 209 P.2d 733 (Idaho 1949)); Indiana
(Brooks v. Robinson, 284 N.E.2d 794 (Ind. 1972)); Kentucky (Layne v. Layne, 433 S.W.2d 116 (Ky.
1968)); Louisiana (United States v. Haynes, 445 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1971)); Massachusetts (Lewis v.
Lewis, 351 N.E.2d 526 (Mass . 1976)); Michigan (Mosier v. Carney, 138 N.W.2d 343 (Mich. 1965));
Minnesota (Beaudette v. Franna, 173 N.W.2d 416 (Minn. 1969)); Nebraska (Imig v. March, 279 N.W.2d
382 (Neb. 1979)); Nevada (Rupert v. Stienne, 528 P.2d 1013 (Nev. 1974)); New Hampshire (Morin v.
Letourneau, 156 A.2d 131 (N.H. 1959)); New Jersey (Immer v. Risko, 267 A.2d 481 (N.J. 1970)); New
Mexico (Maestas v. Overton, 531 P.2d 947 (N.M. 1975)); New York (Weicker v. Weicker, 283 N.Y.S.2d
385 (N.Y. 1967)); North Carolina (Bogen v. Bogen, 12 S.E.2d 649 (N.C. 1941)); North Dakota
(Fitzmaurice v. Fitzmaurice, 242 N.W. 526 (N.D. 1932)); Oklahoma (Courtney v. Courtney, 87 P.2d
660 (Okla. 1938)); South Carolina (Fowler v. Fowler, 130 S.E.2d 568 (S.C. 1963)); South Dakota
(Scotvold v. Scotvold, 298 N.W. 266 (S.D. 1941)); Texas (Bounds v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925 (Tex.
1977) abrogated immunity for intentional torts); Vermont (Richard v. Richard, 300 A.2d 637 (Vt. 1973));
Virginia (Surratt v. Thompson, 183 S.E.2d 200 (Va. 1971)); Washington (Freehe v. Freehe, 500 P.2d
771 (Wash. 1962)); and Wisconsin (Bodenhagen v. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 95 N.W.2d 822 (Wis. 1959)).
Other states have limited the immunity: Illinois (Domestic Violence Act provides that spouses may sue one
another for intentional torts where there is physical harm. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, 1001 (1981).
243. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
244. I do not imply here that the only reason rape is objectionable is because of the possibility of
pregnancy, but I do believe it to be a significant result of the intolerable violation of physical and
psychological integrity and liberty that is the reality of rape.
245. Some courts apply the standard found in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) to criminal rape
statutes that are not sex-neutral to conclude that the classification is based on real differences having a fair
and substantial relation to the legislative object. The essential differences are the physical uniqueness of
men and women. The language employed by the courts in supporting their decisions reveals judicial
recognition that forced sex and reproduction are inextricably linked. State v. Kelly, 526 P.2d 720, 723
(Ariz. 1974) cert. denied, 420 U.S. 935 (1975) ("perceiv[ed] no need by males for protection against
females from rape.. . ."); Brooks v. State, 330 A.2d 670, 673 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975) (regarded the
woman's physical ability to become pregnant as a result of a rape as supporting its claim that "[ilt would
be anomolous indeed if our aspirations toward the ideal of equality.., caused us to overlook our disparate
human vulnerabilities."); Stewart v. State, 534 S.W.2d 875, 877 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976) (concluding
that the statute is constitutional as it is "'intended to protect women from unlawful forced sexual intercourse
... and possible resulting pregnancy .... '"); State v. Ewald, 216 N.W.2d 213, 218 (Wisc. 1974) (did
not believe it necessary "to engage in a dissertation of the . . . problems as they relate to a woman
subjected to ... a possible pregnancy."). But see State v. Smith, 426 A.2d 38 (N.J. 1981) (rape statute
criminalizing only rape of women by men violates the equal protection clause).
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cannot be forced against her will to risk conception through coerced sex, even
by her husband. Ultimately, the courts have justified the end of the marital
rape exemption by suggesting that if is not abrogated, women will continue
to be the "sexual property of their husbands," 2' resulting "in a kind of
bondage of a wife. "247
The language justifying the end of the marital rape exemption mirrors
language describing involuntary servitude. The article began by acknowledging
that the metaphor "women are slaves" is inaccurate. But it has demonstrated
that certain battered women are held in involuntary servitude. What are the
implications, however, of demonstrating that certain battered women are held
in involuntary servitude? This is the subject of the conclusion.
IV. CONCLUSION
Some Congressmen understood that the sweeping statements of the
Thirteenth Amendment could be interpreted as reaching into the private-sphere
relationship of husband and wife. When they voiced their concerns in an
attempt to defeat the Amendment, their concerns were quickly laid to rest by
the Amendment's proponents. Thus, intuitive connections were dismissed as
absurd. This article has attempted to revalidate those intuitive connections by
demonstrating that some women are held in involuntary servitude and should
be protected by the Thirteenth Amendment. More remains to be said, however,
about the significance and limits of the theory.
Battered women's lawyers could use the theory developed here to plead
a violation of a battered woman's constitutional right to be free from
involuntary servitude, but given the previously unchallenged assumption that
private-sphere conduct was excluded from the Thirteenth Amendment's
protection, it is likely that the courts will be resistant. Moreover, one would
have to establish that a civil cause of action and remedy could be implied from
the language of the amendment itself2 4 . or from the federal criminal
involuntary servitude statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1584.249 Obviously, testing this
theory carries the risks of uncharted territory and the advocate should include
all possible theories of liability to avoid any possibility of Rule 11 sanctions.
246. State v. Smith, 426 A.2d 38 (N.J. 1981).
247. State v. Smith, 372 A.2d 386 (N.J. Super. 1977).
248. In Turner v. Unification Church, 602 F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1979), the court upheld the district
court's determination that a civil cause of action and damages could not be inferred from the Thirteenth
Amendment or its criminal enforcing statutes. In affirming, the Fifth Circuit noted that it did not
.subscrib[e] to every particular" of the lower court opinion, but agreed with the conclusion that the plaintiff
failed to state any claim upon which relief could be granted and "with the substance of its analysis material
to that conclusion." Id. at 458. Turner alleged that she had been held in involuntary servitude because she
had been brainwashed and forced to serve the Unification Church. Because Turner raised the issue of a
civil cause of action only in the context of psychological coercion, it offers little guidance for cases of
involuntary servitude involving coercion by physical violence.
249. In Turner v. Unification Church, the district court incorrecty refers to 18 U.S.C. § 1583, instead
of 18 U.S.C. § 1584, as the criminal statute prohibiting the holding of another in involuntary servitude.
473 F. Supp. 367 at 375 (R.I. 1978). 18 U.S.C. § 1583 prohibits the transportation of slaves on vessels.
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As to the prosecution of battered women's cases as involuntary servitude,
even if the Justice Department, which is responsible for prosecuting cases of
criminal involuntary servitude, agreed to seek and then received criminal
indictments of battered women's involuntary servitude cases, a battle would
be fought before the courts to uphold indictments criminalizing conduct within
a private-sphere relationship. In addition, the Justice Department's prosecution
would depend on the investigation of the underlying complaint by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Even if the FBI agreed to investigate these
alleged cases of involuntary servitude, the priority attributed to these cases
would no doubt be low. Furthermore, federalizing a crime such as battering,
which has always been regarded as a crime within a state's jurisdiction, raises
complex issues of law enforcement jurisdiction. 2' 0
The theoretical implications of demonstrating that some battered women
are held in involuntary servitude are vast and complex. Metaphysically, its
most significant contribution is to name certain cases of battery more
accurately. Battery merely describes being struck as in a "beating."25' It
fails to capture the kind of abuse of power central to the battered women's
cases examined in this article. In contrast, involuntary servitude describes the
unwilling "subjection to [a] master, "2 a much more accurate
description."3 This renaming is extremely important as language shapes our
knowledge. 4 In addition, by renaming these cases of battering, we begin
the important task of understanding that violence in intimate relationships can
and often does result in much more than physical and emotional injury; that
it is violence with a purpose, and that the purpose is to end another's free will.
Thus, because involuntary servitude thrusts to the forefront issues of
domination, subordination, and free will, it permits a theoretical shift in the
way in which we think of the issues raised by battering. For example, judges
and legal service providers have been trained in the patriarchal perspective of
battering consciously used in this article in which the dominance and
submission are explained, in part, by gender stereotypes. 52 This
250. In Turner v. Unification Church, the district court reasoned that where "state law has traditionally
addressed such torts as false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault and battery",
there is little "compulsion for the judiciary to erect an additional constitutional cause of action." Id. at 374.
The Court's reasoning is flawed. There are many civil causes of action within a state's jurisdiction that
are also protected by the Constitution. In addition, involuntary servitude is not identical to these state causes
of action.
251. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED
187 (1981).
252. Id. at 2076.
253. See West, supra note 12, at 86, in which she argues that the first step to understanding the
suffering in women's lives is to develop language that captures the truth of women's experience.
254. It is through language and its associations that we invest the world in which we exist with
meaning. "Language is socially constructed and a facile manipulator of our understanding rather than a
neutral descriptive tool." Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tory, 38 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 3, 16 n.44 (1988), (citing Gary Peller, The Metaphysics ofAmerican Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1152,
1167-70 (1985)). For a thorough presentation of literature on the role of language in shaping meaning and
knowledge, see id. at 1160 n.6.
255. Robson, supra note 9, at 579, in which she describes the effects of training that "emphasize[s]
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"hetero-patriarchal" view of battering may be accurate in relation to the
husband/wife relationship used here, but it is not necessarily accurate in
relation to other kinds of intimate relationships in which battering occurs.
Perhaps the comparison of battering cases and involuntary servitude cases will
be particularly useful because in the involuntary servitude cases, issues of
dominance and submission are not gendered; the comparison may therefore
have the potential to expand the concepts of dominance and submission.
Other examples are found in battering cases in which the women who are
battered are referred to as "victims," a category that is used to describe the
whole woman, thereby swallowing the ways in which she is not a victim at
all. This kind of encompassing definition of a battered woman's selfhood is
nowhere more obvious than in cases in which the battered woman's syndrome
is used to describe a woman's view of herself and her inability to control her
world. In contrast, the language of victim is seldom used in the involuntary
servitude cases, and those held in servitude are generally referred to by their
names or by pronouns, not by an ascribed status. Therefore, those held in
involuntary servitude are not labeled wholly as victims. The discourse among
feminists about whether battered women, as victims, can or should be held
responsible for their actions could be informed by an understanding of the role
of free will in the involuntary servitude cases, which include in their definition
of involuntary servitude the supplanting of the subordinate person's will with
the will of the "master." Perhaps through the renaming of some battered
women's cases as cases of involuntary servitude, feminists can use this article
as a point of departure for exploring whether battered women are perceived
as continuing to have free will in situations very similar to those in which the
courts have found that the free will of a person being held to involuntary
servitude was broken by a level and pattern of physical coercion. This article
lays the foundation for such explorations.
dominant/submissive patriarchal arrangement based on objective criteria such as gender." Id. at 579.
256. See Ruthann Robson & S.E. Valentine, Lov(h)ers: Lesbians as Intimate Partners and Lesbian
Legal Theory, 63 TEMPLE L. REV. 511, 513 n.11 (1990), in which the authors advise that "Ihietero-
patriarchy is a term preferred by many lesbians as it denotes the structural, systemic, and ideological
arrangements that determine women's oppression by men through heterosexuality."
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